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BLIND EXPERTISE
CHRISTOPHER TARVER ROBERTSON*
The United States spends many billions of dollars on its system of civil litigation,
and expert witnesses appear in a huge portion of cases. Yet litigants select and retain
expert witnesses in ways that create the appearance of biased hired guns on both
sides of every case, thereby depriving factfinders of a clear view of the facts. As a
result, factfinders too often arrive at the wrong conclusions, thus undermining the
deterrence and compensation functions of litigation. Court-appointment of experts
has been widely proposed as a solution, yet it raises legitimate concerns about accu-
racy and has failed to gain traction in the American adversarial system.
Drawing on the notion of blind research from the sciences and on the concept of
the veil of ignorance from political theory, this Article offers a novel and feasible
reform  that  will  make  it  rational  for  self-interested  litigants  to  present  unbiased
experts to factfinders. The idea is to use an intermediary to select qualified experts
who will render litigation opinions without knowledge of which party is asking. The
result will be greater accuracy of both expert opinions and litigation outcomes com-
pared to both the status quo and litigation with court-appointed experts. A game
theory analysis shows that the current attorney work-product protections make this
“blind expert” procedure a low-cost and no-risk rational strategy for litigants. This
Article argues that blind expertise is a worthwhile reform for the system of medical
malpractice liability in particular and may have wider application wherever layper-
sons must rely upon the advice of potentially biased experts.
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INTRODUCTION
No one will deny that the law should in some way effectively use
expert knowledge wherever it will aid in settling disputes. The only
question is as to how it can do so best.
—Learned Hand1
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty
to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the con-
nection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions
and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and
the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.
—The Federalist2
The United States invests hundreds of billions of dollars in its
system of civil litigation in an effort to redistribute wealth from those
who act wrongfully to those who have been injured.3 At its core, the
litigation  system  has  a  sorting  function,  deciding  in  which  cases  to
force such wealth transfers and in which cases to leave the parties as
they are. Sometimes the system gets this choice right, and sometimes
it fails. Such errors in litigation outcomes can harm blameless parties,
fail to compensate deserving victims, and provide poor guidance for
settlement negotiations in other cases. Thus, the fundamental question
is: How can this expensive sorting procedure become more accurate
and more efficient?
Litigants, attorneys, judges, and jurors are thought to be the main
players in the civil litigation system. However, expert witnesses are
also required in the vast majority of civil trials.4 The expert witnesses
are the ones who tell the factfinder whether a mistake has been made
in medical treatment, whether a plaintiff is really injured, whether a
1 Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1901).
2 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 41 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
3 See LAWRENCE  J.  MCQUILLAN ET AL.,  PAC.  RESEARCH I NST., JACKPOT J USTICE:
THE T RUE C OST OF A MERICA’S T ORT S YSTEM xii–xiii (2007), available at http://liberty
.pacificresearch.org/doclib/20070327_Jackpot_Justice.pdf  (estimating  total  cost,  including
social costs, of civil litigation at $865 billion, or 2.2% of GDP, in 2006); TOWERS PERRIN,
2008  UPDATE ON  U.S.  TORT C OST T RENDS  3  (2008),  http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/
getwebcachedoc?webc=USA/2008/200811/2008_tort_costs_trends.pdf  (showing  that  U.S.
tort system cost $252 billion in 2007). But see Ross Eisenbrey, Tort Costs and the Economy:
Myths, Exaggerations, and Propaganda (Econ. Policy Inst., Briefing Paper No. 174, 2006),
available at http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/bp174/ (criticizing Towers Perrin study);
Economist’s View: The Cost of the Tort System, http://economistsview.blogspot.com/2007/
06/cost-of-tort-system.html (Mar. 27, 2007, 12:15 EST) (criticizing McQuillan study).
4 See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (stating that
experts testified in 86% of civil trials in sample of California cases from 1985 and 1986).
This Article focuses only on the civil context, but its concepts may be adaptable to the
criminal and regulatory contexts as well.April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 177
drug is unreasonably dangerous, or whether a patent claim covers a
disputed  medical  product.5  As  such,  expert  witnesses  are  unique
among  the  players  in  litigation  because  they  purport  to  know  the
answers to the scientific and technical questions at the core of each
case. For that reason, expert witnesses are paid tens of thousands of
dollars to reveal these facts to the factfinders.
In almost every case, the factfinder sees a “battle of the experts,”
each  selected  by,  affiliated  with,  compensated  by,  and  apparently
biased toward a particular party. This structure reduces both the per-
ceived and actual accuracy of the fact-finding process. Assuming there
are real facts of the matter underlying each case, it is analytically true
that this procedure drives the accuracy of litigation experts down to a
bare  fifty  percent  on  questions  that  are  binary.  Thus,  there  can  be
little doubt that the judges and jurors who rely upon these experts
receive poor guidance in resolving cases. As one scholar recently con-
cluded: “The legal system and the scientific method . . . co-exist in a
way that is really hard on truth.”6
This problem not only undermines deterrence and compensation
but also threatens the American jury system. The civil jury is consid-
ered “a basic and fundamental feature of our system of federal juris-
prudence” and one that “should be jealously guarded by the courts.”7
Nonetheless, scholars credibly argue that litigation outcomes now lack
legitimacy because the present system gives the laypeople who serve
on juries such slight epistemic warrant for their judgments, which pur-
port to resolve highly technical disputes between scientists.8 This con-
flict shapes debates over policy reform—as some scholars tell us that
“the United States [is] embroiled in its third major medical malprac-
tice crisis in the past thirty years.”9 The jury is a handy scapegoat for
5 Id. at 1119 (“Half of the experts in our data were medical doctors, and an additional
9% were other medical professionals . . . .”); Adam Liptak, Experts Hired To Shed Light
Can Leave U.S. Courts in Dark, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at A1 (reporting that medical
and mental health experts were used in 42% of civil trials that used experts).
6 Adam Liptak, From One Footnote, a Debate Over the Tangles of Law, Science and
Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at A16 (quoting Professor William R. Freudenburg).
7 Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752–53 (1942).
8 See generally Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process,
in THE P HILOSOPHY OF E XPERTISE 111 (Evan Selinger & Robert P. Crease eds., 2006)
(arguing that factfinders lack necessary scientific expertise, which leads to arbitrary and
illegitimate judgments).
9 William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh, Introduction to MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE
U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 1, 1 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006); see also
Press Release, The White House, President Bush Calls for Medical Liability Reform (Jan.
26, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/01/
print/20040126-3.html  (calling  for  medical  malpractice  reforms).  But  see  generally NEIL
VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY (1997) (arguing that juries
are competent and that medical malpractice liability system is generally sound).178 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
this crisis.10 As long as it is positioned between hired-gun experts, the
system of lay juries may be caught in the crossfire.
More  profoundly,  the  way  courts  use  experts  contributes  to
public perceptions of science and truth. If every serious legal dispute
devolves into a battle of hired-gun experts, the public may come to
believe that “there is no objectively correct scientific truth, only par-
tisan witnesses and the lawyers who retain them.”11 This brand of rela-
tivism, compounded by the mass media’s reflexive notion that there
are two equally valid sides to every story, could make it difficult to
make informed and intelligent policy choices about a wide variety of
questions, from climate change and school curricula to vaccinations
and  stem-cell  research.  Accordingly,  the  U.S.  legal  system  needs  a
healthy and critical relationship with science and expertise.
Part  I  of  this  Article  discusses  the  fundamental  differences
between the two prevailing systems of litigation. On one hand is the
adversarial system used in the United States, where self-interested liti-
gants invest in powerful statements of their own cases by searching for
favorable experts and rebutting the witnesses offered by their adversa-
ries. On the other hand is the inquisitorial system used in much of the
rest of the world, in which the courts themselves appoint experts.12
The inquisitorial system avoids certain biases, but it puts the evidence-
production function in the hands of judges who have little incentive
for thoroughness or error-correction.
In the United States, scholars have long pushed toward a more
inquisitorial system for expertise, and these arguments have led to an
explicit provision in Federal Rule of Evidence 706 allowing judges to
appoint neutral experts.13 Yet Rule 706 has failed to change practice,
since it pushes against the deeply ingrained norms, roles, and incen-
tive structures of the adversarial status quo.
10 See, e.g., VIDMAR, supra note 9, at 3–6 (reviewing criticism of juries by American
Medical Association and others); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of
Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 319–20, 332–33 (1985)
(arguing  that  juries  are  institutionally  unable  to  make  risk  choices  and  that  decisions
should be made by regulatory agencies); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent
Cases—An  Empirical  Peek  Inside  the  Black  Box,  99  MICH.  L.  REV.  365,  370  (2000)
(“[P]opular  perceptions  of  juror  incompetence  and  bias  have  caused  commentators  to
argue that the role of the jury in patent litigation should be severely limited, and many
alternatives have been proposed.”).
11 BRUCE D. SALES & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, EXPERTS IN COURT 144 (2005); see also
John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823,
835–36 (1985) (describing “systematic distrust and devaluation of expertise” by American
people).
12 See Langbein, supra note 11, at 836–41 (using German procedural law to illustrate
Continental approach to experts).
13 FED.  R.  EVID.  706  (“The  court  .  .  .  may  appoint  expert  witnesses  of  its  own
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The dilemma remains unresolved. To date, the litigation system
has not yet found a way to provide factfinders with reliable and unbi-
ased expert signals while still leaving the development of cases in the
hands of the self-interested litigants.
Part II shows how the dichotomy between the adversarial and
inquisitorial systems can be bridged through a privately ordered solu-
tion  to  the  public  problem  of  inaccurate  litigation  outcomes  and
inflated costs. We need not sacrifice objectivity to preserve the best
parts of the adversarial system. A method is available—one inspired
by  the  idea  that  “justice  is  blind,”  by  the  Rawlsian  “veil  of  igno-
rance,”14 and by the gold standard of scientific research: the double-
blind, randomized study.
A similar blind procedure can be employed in civil litigation. A
litigant would request and pay for an expert evaluation of her case,
and an accredited intermediary, interposed between the litigant and
the expert, would perform a double-blinding function.
First,  the  intermediary  would  blind  the  litigant  by  selecting  a
qualified expert in a way that prevents the litigant from handpicking a
favorable expert. Such mechanisms could include creating a pool of
prequalified experts and randomly selecting one for each requesting
litigant or having an agent of the intermediary handpick an expert
without knowing the identity of the sponsor. Second, the intermediary
would  blind  the  expert,  so  the  expert  would  render  her  opinions
without knowledge of who is sponsoring the research or which out-
come the sponsor prefers. The intermediary would assemble a dossier
of the predicate facts of the case and send it and the litigation question
to the chosen expert. The intermediary would compensate the expert
regardless of the substance of her opinions. Though this procedure
cannot guarantee truth, it does eliminate the litigant-induced selec-
tion, compensation, and affiliation biases that degrade the accuracy of
litigation witnesses under the status quo. Nonetheless, the blind proce-
dure is driven not by high-minded altruism but rather by each liti-
gant’s desire to win his case through the use of a more credible expert.
Importantly, the blind procedure leaves the strategic choices in
the hands of litigants who have incentives to win, and the procedure
allows litigants to decide whether to disclose a blind expert’s opinion
to the factfinder only after the litigant learns of the substance of that
opinion. If a blind opinion is unfavorable, the litigant would be per-
mitted to hide it (and the fact that he used the blind procedure at all)
as  attorney  work-product.  If  an  opinion  is  favorable  and  a  litigant
chooses to designate the expert for testimony, then waiver doctrine
14 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971).180 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
would  also  require  him  to  disclose  all  other  blind  opinions,  which
thereby prevents an iterative selection bias.
Part II also shows that even with such disclosure discretion, indi-
vidual  blind  experts  who  testify  would  be  more  reliable  than  indi-
vidual court-appointed experts and even more reliable than individual
experts outside the litigation context. When both litigants in a case try
the procedure, two experts will independently render opinions on the
same case, and the procedure sends a signal to factfinders only when
the two blind experts agree and one litigant discloses his favorable
expert to the jury. An erroneous signal from a blind expert is thus
exponentially less likely than from a single court-appointed expert. If,
on the other hand, the two blind experts disagree, the jury will see
neither or both of them and will thus be left in the same situation as
the status quo. Thus, for truth, the blind procedure has little downside.
Part III shows that in the context of medical malpractice litiga-
tion, the use of the blind procedure can dramatically reduce erroneous
litigation outcomes by resolving the epistemic deadlock that juries are
currently  stuck  in,  when  given  only  hired-gun  experts.  The  blind
expert will instead tend to guide factfinders to the truth. Blind experts
will have this salutary function even if one assumes that there will be a
residual allegiance bias amongst physicians, since the adversarial use
of  the  procedure  tends  to  cancel  erroneous  opinions.  Because  the
blind procedure promises to efficiently improve the accuracy of out-
comes, it is a more attractive solution than other efforts for medical
malpractice reform, such as arbitrary caps on damages or complicated
alternative systems of adjudication.
Part IV argues that blind experts will be a rational and dominant
strategy for litigants. Status quo disclosure rules allow each litigant to
try  the  procedure  without  risk  of  an  adverse  opinion  hurting  their
cases. Thus, after paying the transaction costs, the procedure can only
help the litigant—by increasing his odds of winning the case if it goes
to trial—unlike the double-edged sword of court-appointed experts.
This logic sets up a prisoner’s dilemma in which both litigants will try
the procedure. Blind experts will also be a powerful tool for deter-
mining which cases to file in the first place and will help litigants settle
more cases, saving litigation costs.
Part V argues that the blind procedure will be an efficient reform
to civil litigation, even accounting for its costs, and may make Daubert
screening nearly obsolete. This Part also addresses counterarguments,
including concerns about indeterminate truth, logistics, and the limits
of  institutional  progress.  The  Appendix  offers  a  mathematical
analysis.April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 181
This Article concludes that, at least in medical malpractice litiga-
tion—and likely in other contexts—the blind expert should become
the new gold standard for expertise. Because it exploits longstanding
adversarial  norms  and  incentive  structures—rather  than  trying  to
rebuild the American legal system from scratch—the blind expert is
also a particularly pragmatic reform.
I
THE TRUTH-DEFICIT IN LITIGATION
This Part lays out the problem. First, it explains why factfinders
need help finding the scientific and technical truths that are key ques-
tions in most cases and shows why and how litigants’ seemingly biased
experts fail to provide useful truth-signals to factfinders. It then argues
that the traditional solutions of mandated disclosure, expert profes-
sionalism, and exclusion under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc.15 are of limited benefit. The Part concludes by arguing that
the potential solution of court-appointed expert witnesses is problem-
atic and rarely used.
A. The Need for Truth-Signals
Both the procedure and substance of the American legal system
are predicated on the assumption that, in any given case, there really
is a fact of the matter. The elaborate procedures and evidentiary rules
are designed “to the end that the truth may be ascertained and pro-
ceedings justly determined.”16 The function of the substantive law is
to delineate which behaviors shall incur liability and which shall not. If
the distinction had no basis in reality, the law would be for naught.
Although talk of “truth” can seem slippery, for present purposes
let  us  adopt  the  common  sense  working  presumptions  of  the  legal
system—for example, some plaintiffs really are injured (and others
are  not)  and  some  defendants  really  did  cause  those  injuries  (and
others did not).17 Truth obtains when allegations are backed up by the
real facts on the ground. Still, we need not assert that such truths are
always simple, uncontestable, completely shorn from value judgments,
or even directly observable in the world. Moreover, we can concede
15 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (holding that trial judge can exclude expert testimony for
lack of reliability).
16 FED. R. EVID. 102.
17 Whether a given doctor did or did not “meet the standard of care” is a different sort
of fact (one might call it a “social fact”), but the legal system still presumes that it is a
question of fact and that the physician either did or did not meet that standard. See infra
text  accompanying  notes  210–11  (discussing  standard  of  care  in  medical  malpractice
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that in some situations, the law may be wrong in its presupposition
that there is an exogenous truth to be found.18 Rather than wading
into the philosophical debates about competing notions of truth, how-
ever, this Article instead contributes to the debates about procedure,
evidence, and expertise.19
It goes without saying that outcome accuracy is an important con-
cept in litigation. Some suppose that the truth has intrinsic value for
the legal system, just as it does in the sciences.20 A reasonable degree
of accuracy is also arguably necessary to make adjudication morally
binding and legitimate.21 Aside from any such intrinsic value, how-
ever, the legal system’s truth-seeking function clearly has instrumental
value. The substantive law exists to serve deterrence, compensation,
and sometimes punishment; and the achievement of these purposes
demands accuracy.
In particular, inaccuracy in litigation outcomes undermines deter-
rence by imposing liability on some reasonable conduct and by failing
to impose liability on some unreasonable conduct.22 The first problem
incentivizes potential defendants to use costly measures to avoid lia-
bility, such as “defensive medicine,” rather than simply practicing rea-
sonably.23  On  the  other  hand,  in  2000,  the  Institute  of  Medicine
18 Part V.B infra explores this complication in some detail.
19 To the extent that a definition is necessary, let us adopt a long-run, pragmatic notion
of truth, such as that offered by Charles S. Peirce: “The opinion which is fated to be ulti-
mately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth . . . .” Charles
Sanders  Peirce,  How  To  Make  Our  Ideas  Clear,  in PRAGMATISM O LD AND N EW:
SELECTED WRITINGS 127, 147 (Susan Haack & Robert Lane eds., 2006) (citation omitted);
see also Susan Haack, Of Truth, in Science and in Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 985, 987–88
(2008) (offering “account of truth in the sciences” that “combine[s] a full acknowledgment
of the fallibility and incompleteness of the scientific enterprise with a robustly objective
conception of truth”).
20 See Haack, supra note 19, at 986 (“[T]ruth is surely relevant to legal proceedings, for
we want, not simply resolutions, but just resolutions; and substantial justice requires factual
truth.”). But see Daniel E. Koshland, Jr., Editorial, Scientific Evidence in Court, 266 SCI-
ENCE 1787 (1994) (arguing that truth-seeking function is not central to law).
21 See Brewer, supra note 8, at 112–13 (arguing that factfinders’ lack of necessary scien-
tific expertise results in arbitrary and illegitimate judgments); Lawrence B. Solum, Proce-
dural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 190 (2004) (arguing that inaccurate outcomes can
undermine legitimacy of judgments).
22 Compare Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Anal-
ysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 309–10 (1994) (arguing that it may be costly to improve accu-
racy but “greater accuracy is valuable only to the extent it involves dimensions about which
individuals are informed at the time they act”), with Daniel R. Ortiz, Neoactuarialism:
Comment on Kaplow, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 403, 409 (1994) (arguing that accuracy can have
value  independent  of  one  particular  case  by  encouraging  future  actors  to  pursue  more
information).
23 The  actual  amount  of  defensive  medicine  (and  the  costs  thereof)  is  a  subject  of
intense debate amongst empiricists. Part of the debate turns on a semantic question of
what  counts  as  defensive  medicine.  See  David  Klingman  et  al.,  Measuring  DefensiveApril 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 183
concluded that between 44,000 and 98,000 patients die every year in
hospitals as the result of medical errors, ones that the medical mal-
practice liability system failed to deter.24 Inaccuracy in resolving cases
also fails to incentivize plaintiffs to file only meritorious suits in the
first place, since even bad cases have some probability of being com-
pensated.  Moreover,  to  the  extent  that  inaccuracy  causes  litigation
outcomes  to  be  less  predictable,  insurance  costs  go  up.  There  are
likely similar stories to be told in other areas of litigation.
Now, consider how this truth-seeking function is operationalized.
In  our  legal  system,  “factfinders”—juries,  judges,  and,  increasingly,
arbitrators—decide whether to impose liability in each case, and we
conduct trials to assist them in “the determination of truth.”25
In the adversarial system, each of the litigants brings evidence to
the factfinder in a dynamic that can be conceived of as a signaling
game.26 The word “signal” is appropriate because the factfinder is pas-
sive  and  alienated  from  the  facts;  it  only  experiences  the  truth  as
mediated by the images, words, and other evidence that the litigants
and judge decide to provide. The factfinder decides which version of
the case is most plausible and which judgment is most warranted by
the signals it has received.
The vast majority (potentially upwards of 85%) of trials involve
expert witnesses,27 whose testimony is essential for resolving the sci-
entific or technical disputes at the core of the case. The very idea of
“expertise” is that, compared to laymen like juries and judges, some
people  are  better  equipped  through  “knowledge,  skill,  experience,
training,  or  education”28  to  perceive  the  truth  in  their  specialized
domains.29
Outside  the  litigation  setting,  we  laypersons  really  do  expect
experts to converge on the truth, and we rely upon them accordingly.
Medicine Using Clinical Scenario Surveys, 21 J. HEALTH P OL. POL’Y & L. 185, 187–90
(1996)  (describing  four  different  types  of  practices  that  might  be  termed  “defensive
medicine”).
24 COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN 1
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter IOM REPORT].
25 Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (describing determination of truth
as purpose of trials).
26 See  Roger G. Koppl et al., Epistemics for Forensics, 5 EPISTEME 141, 145 (2008)
(describing experts as senders and juries as receivers of messages). The sense of “signal”
that I use is distinct from, and somewhat broader than, the way the term is used in the
economics literature. For a review of the meaning of signals in economics, see generally
Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 434 (2002).
27 See supra note 4.
28 FED. R. EVID. 702.
29 Cf. Brewer, supra note 8, at 115 (describing this relationship as “practical epistemic
deference”).184 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
We expect that if we randomly selected and consulted one or more
qualified experts, they would be correct more often than not and more
often than we laypersons would be. That is why we rely upon them to
cure  our  diseases,  protect  our  drinking  water,  and  design  our  air-
planes. This assumption—that unbiased experts will tend to converge
on  the  truth  more  often  than  those  lacking  expertise—is  a  central
assumption of the modern world, a central assumption of the legal
system, and a central assumption of this Article.30
B. Litigants’ Failure To Provide Reliable Signals
Despite the legal system’s aspiration toward truth, litigants often
fail to provide truth-signals to factfinders. Instead, litigants reduce the
accuracy  of  their  expert  witnesses  to  that  of  coin-flippers.  Through
selection, affiliation, and compensation biases, litigants make experts
more favorable but less accurate compared to their base rates of accu-
racy in the real world. I consider each bias in turn.
1. Selection
First,  with  only  slight  hyperbole,  Judge  Jack  Weinstein  has
observed, “An expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost
any factual theory, no matter how frivolous.”31 Indeed, each litigant
can shop around for favorable expert opinions.32 Litigants use many
devices  to  cherry-pick  experts  including  litigation  history,  word-of-
mouth, and published papers. If a handpicked expert turns out to be
unfavorable, the litigant simply picks again.
Thus, in litigation, there tends to be one expert on each side of
almost every technical issue, but in the real world, qualified experts
are rarely so evenly split. As one jurist has noted, “Apart from any
question  of  dishonesty,  the  adversarial  system  is  .  .  .  calculated  to
bring  forward  unrepresentative  opinions  in  cases  where  a  range  of
30 For example, we expect that if we consulted all the qualified experts about a given
question—say whether a certain medical procedure should be performed in a given con-
text—and asked them to score the case from zero (definitely should not) to five (definitely
should), a (perhaps truncated) bell curve would emerge, with a peak around the “true”
answer. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that there is no quick way to prove this assumption
empirically, since we have no access to highly technical truths except through experts. The
proof must be longitudinal and pragmatic, comparing the success of laypersons with and
without experts.
31 Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 482 (1986).
32 See David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure
of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 455 (2008) (distinguishing ordinary wit-
nesses from expert witnesses on basis that “attorneys can shop from an almost unlimited
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opinions exists.”33 Of course, this selection strategy depends on the
pool of qualified experts in a given field containing at least one who is
willing to render a favorable opinion for the litigant. But once that
expert is found and retained, he is transformed from being perhaps 1
in 1000 outside the courtroom to 1 in 2 inside the courtroom. This
problem of unrepresentative observations is called selection bias.
2. Affiliation
Affiliation bias arises when the expert interacts with the litigant
before and during the process of rendering her opinions. The litigant’s
attorney  talks  with  the  potential  expert,  buys  her  meals,  suggests
hypotheses,  provides  data  and  even  scientific  literature,  proposes
methods and criteria, coaches her on language to use, and even edits
her final report.34 A litigant prepares an expert witness, “push[ing]
[her] to identify with the lawyers on her side and to become a partisan
member of the litigation team.”35
John  Langbein  has  explained  that  “those  of  us  who  serve  as
expert witnesses are known as ‘saxophones[,]’ . . . a musical instru-
ment on which the lawyer sounds the desired notes.”36 This is not the
worst of the epithets.37 Courts sometimes note extreme situations in
which an expert has altogether “cast aside his scholar’s mantle and
[become] a shill” for the party that retained him.38 But these situa-
tions are not outliers in an otherwise healthy system: In one study,
both federal judges and attorneys cited “experts abandon[ing] objec-
tivity and becom[ing] advocates for the side that hired them” as the
most frequent problem with expert testimony.39
Lawyers routinely exploit various psychological heuristics to bias
their  experts.  One  such  heuristic  is  the  anchor-and-adjust  tactic,  in
which a person faced with a question starts not with a blank slate, but
instead  with  an  initial  value  or  hypothesis  that  biases  later,  better-
informed  estimates.40  A  hypothesis  suggested  by  a  litigant—for
33 Id.  at  454  n.11  (quoting  Justice  H.D.  Sperling  of  Supreme  Court  of  New  South
Wales).
34 See  Gross,  supra  note  4,  at  1139  (discussing  cooperative  relationship  developed
between attorneys and experts while preparing testimony).
35 Id.
36 Langbein, supra note 11, at 835.
37 See Gross, supra note 4, at 1115 (reporting derogatory sentiments of both lawyers
and other professionals toward expert witnesses).
38 Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi., 877 F.2d 1333, 1340 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J.).
39 MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 6 tbl.2 (2000).
40 See generally Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant:
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example,  a  low  value  for  damages—then  becomes  a  “cognitive
anchor” for the expert. Even if people have contrary observations,
they often fail to sufficiently adjust away from the anchor. Experts,
like people in general, are susceptible to this bias. In one empirical
study of the anchoring heuristic, “a student from a totally unrelated
field  gave  an  estimate  about  how  large  the  solution  to  a  problem
should  be  to  an  expert  faced  with  deciding  the  problem.”41  Even
“[t]his information, received from a low-credibility source, was still
sufficient to create an anchor impacting the estimates made by the
experts.”42
Similar phenomena, called “observer effects,” have been exten-
sively  documented  in  the  field  of  forensic  science,  in  experiments
ranging from visual hair comparison to handwriting and fingerprint
identification.43 In each area, when scientists were given extraneous
information such as a preferred outcome, the effect of that informa-
tion outweighed the effect of contrary technical information.44
Similarly, “confirmatory bias” causes experts to “ignore informa-
tion  that  does  not  support  their  hypotheses,  interpret  ambiguous
information  as  supporting  their  hypotheses,  or  .  .  .  not  consider
whether  information  supports  alternative  hypotheses.”45  Indeed,
scholars have documented the problem of people tending to “see what
they expect to see” across many fields of expertise, from astronomy
and economics to medicine and dispute resolution.46
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 120, 120–21 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman
eds.,  2002)  (reviewing  studies  confirming  anchoring  effect);  Amos  Tversky  &  Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128–30
(1974) (describing research on anchoring effect).
41 D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in
Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 18
(2002) (describing work by Birte Englich and Thomas Mussweiler); see also Birte Englich
et  al.,  Playing  Dice  with  Criminal  Sentences:  The  Influence  of  Irrelevant  Anchors  on
Experts’  Judicial  Decision  Making,  32  PERSONALITY  &  SOC.  PSYCHOL.  BULL.  188,  197
(2006) (concluding that “influence of irrelevant anchors on sentencing decisions did not
depend on judges’ experience and expertise”).
42 Risinger, supra note 41, at 18.
43 See generally D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A
Glass Nine-Tenths Full (This Is About the Other Tenth), 50 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (2009) (forth-
coming 2010) (manuscript at 7–11), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1437276 (summa-
rizing work in this field).
44 Id.
45 HOWARD N. GARB, STUDYING THE CLINICIAN 183, 182–97 (1998) (discussing various
cognitive heuristics, biases, and knowledge structures of clinicians).
46 See, e.g., Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals,
Tragic Flaws, and Judicial Gatekeeping, 44 JUDGES’ J. 16, 27 (2005) (reviewing this evi-
dence);  see  also  Troyen  A.  Brennan,  Helping  Courts  with  Toxic  Torts:  Some  Proposals
Regarding  Alternative  Methods  for  Presenting  and  Assessing  Scientific  Evidence  in
Common Law Courts, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989) (“Judges fear that juries can beApril 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 187
In one well-known study, researchers assigned subjects as negoti-
ators in a dispute, asked the subjects to assess the “fair” value of the
case they were assigned, and incentivized the subjects for accuracy.47
One group of subjects was asked to make this value assessment before
being assigned to a side; the other made the value assessment after
being  assigned.48  The  affiliation  skewed  the  assessments  of  fairness
made by those assigned to a side, even though they had incentives for
accuracy.49  Of  course,  in  the  real  world,  expert  witnesses  are  not
incentivized for accuracy, so the problem is exacerbated.
3. Compensation
A third vector that degrades truth-signals is compensation bias.
Writing about expert witnesses in 1901, Learned Hand had already
concluded that “[e]nough has been said elsewhere as to the natural
bias of one called in such matters to represent a single side and liber-
ally paid to defend it.”50 Upton Sinclair put the general principle more
colorfully: “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when
his salary depends upon his not understanding it!”51
Unsurprisingly, empirical research has shown that contingent fee
arrangements create bias.52 Of course, expert witnesses’ fees are not
blatantly contingent; litigants instead pay experts on an hourly basis.53
Nonetheless, this fee structure induces experts toward favorable opin-
misled by highly paid experts who will find at least some support in the voluminous scien-
tific literature for any position, even when that position is repudiated by the majority of
scientists.”); Kenton K. Yee, Dueling Experts and Imperfect Verification, 28 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 246, 246 (2008) (“Given [economics experts’] freedom to cherry pick from a con-
tinuum of choices within a broad gray line, it is easy for experts to proffer partisan testi-
mony without being dishonest.”).
47 Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON.
REV. 1337, 1338–39 (1995).
48 Id. at 1339.
49 Id. at 1340.
50 Hand, supra note 1, at 53; see also Abinger v. Ashton, (1873) 17 L.R.Eq. 358, 373–74
(U.K.) (describing distrust of expert evidence because of natural bias of expert toward
employer).
51 UPTON S INCLAIR, I, CANDIDATE FOR G OVERNOR: AND H OW I GOT L ICKED 109
(Univ. Cal. Press 1994) (1935).
52 See, e.g., Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Dis-
closing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9, 14 (2005) (describing biasing effect of
incentives when expert is paid according to value of factfinder’s estimates). The Cain et al.
study is discussed in greater detail in text accompanying notes 72 to 77 infra.
53 Still, some experts provide free or reduced-cost initial consultations (“you only pay if
you like what I say”). See, e.g., MedWitness, Ltd., Fees, http://www.medwitness.com/fees
.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2008). This is similar to a contingency fee arrangement in that the
expert is only hired (and is therefore only paid) if he gives a favorable opinion.188 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
ions since anything else would result in termination from the given
case and may preclude future work.54
The biasing effect of compensation is also present in sponsored
medical  research.  Scholars  conclude  that  “[n]umerous  systematic
reviews and meta-analyses indicate that industry-funded studies are
more likely than other studies to favor novel interventions.”55 It is not
usually  the  case  that  compensation  bias  causes  experts  to  fabricate
favorable opinions from whole cloth,56 but it can nudge them to shade
their views and “draw more favorable qualitative conclusions”57 from
their findings than they otherwise would.
In the litigation context, experimental studies have shown that
witnesses interviewed by partisan attorneys prior to testifying tend to
deliver more biased testimony than those interviewed by nonpartisan
attorneys.58 Indeed, experiments suggest that the opinions of mental
health experts in criminal cases are significantly biased in the direction
of the side that requested their opinions.59 One controversial study
documented the problem of litigant-induced bias by comparing the
opinions rendered by radiologists retained by plaintiffs’ attorneys in
asbestos cases to opinions rendered by a panel of “independent” radi-
ologists.60  The  plaintiffs’  experts  found  physiological  abnormalities
95.9% of the time, while “independent” reviewers found abnormali-
ties only 4.5% of the time.61
54 See Leslie I. Boden & David Ozonoff, Litigation-Generated Science: Why Should We
Care?, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 117, 118 (2008) (“Often it is not just the lump sum . . .
that is the economic incentive. Future business or continued employment may be even
more powerful.”).
55 Susannah  L.  Rose  et  al.,  Relationships  Between  Authorship  Contributions  and
Authors’  Industry  Financial  Ties  Among  Oncology  Clinical  Trials,  27  J.  CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1), available at http://jco.ascopubs.org/cgi/
reprint/JCO.2008.21.6606v1.
56 But see In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(describing litigation diagnoses that were “manufactured for money”).
57 Rose et al., supra note 55, at 1.
58 See, e.g., Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar, Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testi-
monial Evidence: Effects of Lawyer’s Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 320, 325 (1980) (finding that witnesses interviewed by defense attorneys,
though not plaintiff attorneys, presented more biased testimony than witnesses interviewed
by nonpartisan attorneys).
59 Randy K. Otto, Bias and Expert Testimony of Mental Health Professionals in Adver-
sarial Proceedings: A Preliminary Investigation, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 267, 271 (1989).
60 Joseph N. Gitlin et al., Comparison of “B” Readers’ Interpretations of Chest Radi-
ographs  for  Asbestos  Related  Changes,  11  ACAD.  RADIOLOGY  843,  843  (2004).  I  put
“independent” in scare quotes because the study authors admit that the research was done
on behalf of defense attorneys. Id. at 844; see also L. Christine Oliver et al., Letter to the
Editor, 11 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 1397, 1397 (2004) (arguing that among other problems, “the
study was done at the behest of attorneys for defendants in asbestos litigation”).
61 Gitlin et al., supra note 60, at 855.April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 189
C. Disclosure, Professionalism, and Exclusion
When  selection,  affiliation,  and  compensation  biases  are  put
together, the predictable result in litigation is that each side retains a
favorable expert witness. Rather than seeing a sample of expert opin-
ions that cluster around the truth, as in the real world, in litigation the
factfinder sees only two opposite extremes of expert opinion.62 Ana-
lytically, then, expert witnesses are correct in their bottom-line opin-
ions only half the time,63 and thus are not particularly helpful to the
factfinder—at least not as simple signals of the bottom-line truth.
Perhaps  this  is  not  such  a  dire  problem.  The  status  quo  legal
system forces parties to disclose certain ways in which they have influ-
enced their experts, and allows adversaries to cross-examine experts
to reveal biases. The system also relies on the experts’ own profession-
alism to keep them honest, and it allows judges to exclude the most
biased  experts.  This  Section,  however,  describes  the  limits  of  these
approaches.
1. Mandated Disclosures and Cross-Examination
The  United  States  Supreme  Court  says  that  the  adversarial
“system is premised on the well-tested principle that truth—as well as
fairness—is ‘best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of
the question.’”64 The factfinder is supposed “to separate the wheat
from the chaff” of expert testimony.65 Lawyers help by firing up the
“greatest  legal  engine  ever  invented  for  the  discovery  of  truth”—
cross-examination.66
Because “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants,” the
litigants’ mandated disclosures of money and influence are central to
this system.67 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) requires that
parties disclose for each testifying expert “a statement of the compen-
62 See supra note 30 (describing bell curve of expert opinions).
63 Although intended to be somewhat hyperbolic, this claim is analytically true in cases
in which each expert’s testimony can be reduced to a binary (p or not-p) claim, only one of
which is true. Although there may be complexity and nuance, in the end the testimony
either supports the plaintiff or it does not. The 50% claim further requires the assumption
that the number of experts that each side brings to trial is uncorrelated with whether that
side is arguing for the truth.
64 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (quoting Irving R. Kaufman, Does the Judge
Have a Right to Qualified Counsel?, 61 A.B.A. J. 569, 569 (1975)); see also United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984) (describing “crucible of meaningful adversarial testing”).
65 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 n.7 (1983). This notion that it is the jury’s job to
sort wheat from chaff is qualified by FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702 and the holding of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert is discussed in
detail in Part I.C.3 infra.
66 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (citations omitted).
67 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92 (2d ed. 1932).190 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
sation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case”68 and dis-
close all materials that the expert considered in forming his opinions.69
With such knowledge, the factfinder can weigh the testimony accord-
ingly.70 This provision mirrors other areas of the law where disclosure
of potential sources of bias is a strong norm.71
But empirical research suggests that disclosure does not amelio-
rate  the  bias  problem,  and  may  even  make  it  worse.  In  an  experi-
mental  setting,  Daylian  Cain  and  colleagues  created  an  estimation
task,  incentivized  subjects  for  accuracy,  and  provided  subjects  with
“experts”  who  had  better  information.72  Some  of  the  experts  had
incentives to provide biased advice, and others had incentives to pro-
vide accurate advice. Unsurprisingly, the laypersons who relied upon
experts with conflicting interests performed significantly worse than
the others.73 The researchers also tested the factfinders’ decisions with
and without mandated disclosure of the experts’ conflicted interests.74
Counterintuitively, in the regime with  disclosure of conflicted inter-
ests, the factfinders were actually less accurate than in the regime of
undisclosed conflicts.75 Under a regime of mandated disclosure, the
biased experts actually provided worse advice, perhaps because the
disclosure made experts feel a sense of “moral license.”76 Even with
disclosure, the factfinders failed to discount the experts’ opinions suf-
68 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(vi).
69 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii); see also Reg’l Airport Auth. v. LFG, LLC, 460 F.3d
697, 713–17 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2) requires disclosure of all
information provided to testifying experts, including attorney work product). But see infra
text  accompanying  note  79  (noting  efforts  to  change  Federal  Rules  to  prevent  such
disclosures).
70 See Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Defer-
ence or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1145 (1993) (“Bias is a ‘problem’ . . . only if
. . . the fact finder will not accurately perceive the bias and adequately account for it.”
(citation omitted)).
71 See, e.g., Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 101–309, 92 Stat.
1824, 1824–61 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S. Code) (requiring govern-
ment employees to disclose finances); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 54 Stat. 789,
852 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006)) (requiring investment adviser
who is acting as principal in transaction with client or acting on behalf of person other than
client to disclose this fact to customer); Kevin Freking, Drug Maker To Disclose Pay to
Doctors,  HOUSTON C HRON.,  Sept.  24,  2008,  at  5  (reporting  that  several  states  require
drugmakers to disclose their payments to doctors).
72 Cain et al., supra note 52, at 9–10.
73 Id. at 14.
74 Id. at 10.
75 Id.  at  14,  16  tbl.6.  This  finding  was  statistically  significant  once  the  researchers
adjusted for the factfinders’ systematic biases for low estimates.
76 See id. at 6–7, 22 (explaining that disclosure may give experts strategic reasons and
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ficiently.77  In  short,  mandated  disclosure  worsened  the  accuracy  of
outcomes.
In the adversarial litigation setting with opposing biased experts,
one might hope for better results.78 However, both sides hand-select,
prepare, and pay favorable experts to testify, and the disclosures of
payments and interactions offer little or no signal as to which side is
right.  Indeed,  in  recognition  of  this  point,  rulemakers  are  now
expanding  attorney  work-product  protections  to  prevent  discovery
into the litigants’ efforts to influence the views of their expert wit-
nesses.79  Without  such  information,  factfinders  are  apparently  sup-
posed  to  assume  that  the  experts  on  both  sides  are  approximately
equally biased by their interactions with the litigants.
In such a situation, when a factfinder lacks a clear fact-signal, it
might be tempting to split the difference.80 Yet offsetting disclosures
of biases (or assumptions about equal biases) do not reliably reveal
the truth. If the task were to estimate the value of coins in a jar, and
one  partisan  expert  said  “$50”  and  the  other  partisan  expert  said
“$100,” a factfinder might reasonably believe that the true value is
around $75. However, this tactic breaks down whenever one expert is
more honest than the other. Indeed, the tactic punishes such honesty.
77 Id. at 6.
78 For an example of a study showing that adversarial settings improve outcomes, see
Cheryl  Boudreau  &  Mathew  D.  McCubbins,  Nothing  But  the  Truth?  Experiments  on
Adversarial Competition, Expert Testimony, and Decision Making, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 751 (2008). Boudreau and McCubbins argue that their findings show that “contrary
to critics of our adversarial system, competition between experts, by itself, induces truth
telling and improves decision making.” Id. at 785. However, the Boudreau and McCubbins
study has limited external validity for assessing the American litigation system. Unlike the
real litigation setting, where jurors hear from experts who always disagree on the bottom-
line  questions  of  the  case,  in  the  Boudreau  and  McCubbins  study,  mock  jurors  were
offered two competing experts who either agreed or disagreed. Id. at 759. This was in part
because Boudreau and McCubbins’s experiment contained institutional constraints—such
as monetary penalties—to deter experts from lying, id. at 761, unlike the real world where
“[i]t  is  virtually  impossible  to  prosecute  an  expert  witness  for  perjury.”  Sears  v.
Rutishauser, 466 N.E.2d 210, 212 (Ill. 1984). Boudreau and McCubbins note these limits,
writing that “competition [between experts], by itself, tends not to help [factfinders] . . . .
However, the additional institutions . . . help [factfinders] achieve large improvements in
their decisions . . . .” Boudreau & McCubbins, supra, at 775.
79 See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND P ROCEDURE 10–12  (2009),  available  at  http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/
Combined_ST_Report_Sept_2009.pdf  (proposing  reform  to  Rule  26  that  would  apply
work-product protection to all communications between litigants and their trial experts, in
part because litigants already often agree to stipulate that there will be no such discovery,
perhaps assuming that it will be zero-sum game).
80 See Yee, supra note 46, at 246, 255 (showing that when factfinders cannot reliably
distinguish  good  evidence  from  bad  evidence  in  cases  with  dueling  experts,  difference-
splitting may be rational solution for factfinder).192 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
This will be especially problematic when the true value is near a nat-
ural limit, such as zero (e.g., no liability).
When unable to split the difference, the factfinder may throw up
its hands and suppose that, as one judge recently said, “[t]he two sides
have  canceled  each  other  out.”81  Or  the  factfinder  may  attempt  to
weigh  the  substantive  merits  of  the  highly  technical  testimony  and
decide the technical issue itself. “But,” as Learned Hand asked, “how
can  the  jury  judge  between  two  [expert]  statements  each  founded
upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It is just
because they are incompetent for such a task that the expert is neces-
sary at all.”82 Scholars debate the jury’s capacity for making such judg-
ments, which likely varies by context.83
Facing this impasse, factfinders may also resort to more-or-less
irrelevant proxies for the truth.84 Some proxies are better than others,
ranging from the credentials of the expert and the comprehensiveness
of her analysis to the attractiveness of an attorney or the race of a
litigant. And to the extent that it is the expert herself who actually
persuades the factfinder, it may have more to do with her rhetorical
skills and personality than the substance of her testimony.85
Thus,  overall,  it  seems  clear  that  mandatory  disclosure  of  the
biases of adversarial expert witnesses does not provide the reliable
truth-signal that the lay factfinder needs.
81 Liptak, supra note 5, at A1 (quoting Judge Denver D. Dillard of Johnson County
District Court in Iowa City).
82 Hand, supra note 1, at 54.
83 Compare Brewer, supra note 8, at 136 (arguing that allowing laypersons to rely on
their own substantive judgment is “so obviously an unsatisfactory solution”), with  Neil
Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121,
1136–37 (2001) (reviewing psychological research showing that some capacities for tech-
nical judgment can be taught to laypersons).
84 See VIDMAR,  supra  note  9,  at  172–73  (arguing  that  both  judges  and  juries  use
proxies, such as general impressions of character and veracity, to resolve conflicting expert
testimony); Brewer supra note 8, at 136–45 (criticizing use of proxies such as expert’s cre-
dentials or demeanor).
85 See, e.g., MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PICUS, RAND, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PER-
FORMANCE: OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE 27–28 (1987) (documenting
how jurors in asbestos trial relied on experts’ personal characteristics, social status, and
billing rates to determine their credibility); Jane Goodman et al., What Confuses Juries in
Complex  Cases,  TRIAL,  Nov.  1985,  at  65,  68  (describing  how  post-trial  interviews  with
jurors showed that they made “personal judgments about the experts and not about the
information relayed”); Langbein, supra note 11, at 836 (explaining that juries “system-
atic[ally] distrust and devalu[e] . . . expertise” because all expert witnesses can be made to
look biased); cf. Dennis J. Devine et al., Strength of Evidence, Extraevidentiary Influence,
and the Liberation Hypothesis: Data from the Field, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 136, 136
(2009) (discussing “liberation hypothesis” that “jury verdicts will be determined by the
strength of the evidence in most trials but susceptible to non-evidentiary influences when
the evidence is ‘close’”).April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 193
2. Professionalism
The  legal  system  also  relies  upon  experts’  professionalism—
including their training, long-term self-interests, and ethical commit-
ments—to tether them to the truth. I consider each in turn.
According  to  one  commentator,  “physicians  believe  they  are
invulnerable to undue influence from industry . . . because they are
convinced that their knowledge of the medical literature makes them
impervious to industry influence.”86 Indeed, Federal Rule of Evidence
702 requires that testifying experts be qualified by their “knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education.”87 Similarly, many states have
passed laws requiring that medical malpractice experts have profes-
sional credentials and that plaintiffs’ lawyers get favorable opinions
from such professionals before filing their cases.88 All this presumes
that  experts’  professional  training  makes  them  more  reliable  as  a
signal of the truth than a mere partisan lawyer would be.
The expert’s self-interests also limit the range of possible litiga-
tion positions. If an expert takes an untenable position and then suf-
fers  a  devastating  cross-examination  or  a  disparaging  remark  by  a
judge, then she makes herself unattractive to future potential clients.
If an expert has a record of scholarly publications, this will also limit
the litigation positions that she can credibly assert.89
Professional associations also have ethical canons.90 These ethical
canons for professional practice tend to hold that conflicts of interest
should be avoided, and where unavoidable they should be resolved in
86 Peter A. Ubel, Commentary: How Did We Get Into This Mess?, in CONFLICTS OF
INTERESTS:  CHALLENGES AND S OLUTIONS IN B USINESS,  LAW,  MEDICINE,  AND P UBLIC
POLICY 142, 143 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005); see also Michael Lamport Commons et
al., Expert Witness Perceptions of Bias in Experts, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 70,
73 (2004) (“We might conclude . . . that a state of relative denial exists among respondant[ ]
[experts] as to the power of potentially biasing factors to affect their decision making.”).
Indeed, there is good reason to think that professionals are not impervious to bias, as many
of the studies described in Part I.B were conducted on professionals.
87 FED. R. EVID. 702.
88 Aaron S. Kesselheim & David M. Studdert, Role of Professional Organizations in
Regulating Physician Expert Witness Testimony, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2907, 2908 (2007)
(“[As of] 2006, approximately 22 state legislatures had enacted minimum qualifying stan-
dards  for  physician  experts.  Most  of  these  laws  spell  out  basic  requirements,  such  as
holding  a  current  medical  license  or  involvement  in  active  clinical  practice.”);  see  also
Catherine T. Struve, Expertise and the Legal Process, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE
U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 173, 174 (describing certificate-of-merit pro-
visions, which require qualified expert to attest that case has bona fide scientific basis).
89 However,  these  publications  are  also  signals  to  litigants  searching  for  favorable
opinions.
90 See Aaron S. Kesselheim & David M. Studdert, Professional Oversight of Expert
Witnesses, 249 ANNALS OF SURGERY 168, 168 (2009) (explaining that many medical col-
leges,  boards,  and  societies  have  developed  professional  guidelines  for  those  acting  as
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favor of clients.91 The conflict of interest analysis in medicine usually
focuses on the physician’s conflict with a patient’s interests.92 In litiga-
tion,  the  conflict  is  different:  Litigants  pay  testifying  physicians  for
favorable  testimony,  but  the  factfinders  depend  on  the  experts  to
reveal  the  truth,  as  the  experts  have  sworn  to  do.93  The  American
Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics contains no imperative
for expert witnesses to avoid the conflicts inherent in litigation, per-
haps because under current procedures there is no apparent way of
doing so.94
The Code of Medical Ethics explains that “[p]hysician testimony
must not be influenced by financial compensation” but implies that
only the crudest forms of incentives, such as “compensation that is
contingent upon the outcome of litigation,” are actually prohibited.95
However, as described in Part I.B.3, the expert’s compensation typi-
cally still is contingent on her opinions being favorable to her sponsor.
Furthermore,  guidelines  requiring  expert  medical  witnesses  to
engage in reasonable investigation and truthful testimony have little
deterrent  effect  because  professional  associations  rarely  observe
91 See, e.g.,A M. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 8.03 (2008–2009 ed.), avail-
able at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical
-ethics.shtml [hereinafter AMA CODE] (“Under no circumstances may physicians place
their own financial interest above the welfare of their patients.”).
92 See, e.g., Howard Brody, The Physician-Patient Relationship, in MEDICAL ETHICS 75,
93 (Robert M. Veatch ed., 2d ed. 1997) (describing conflicts between patient welfare and
obligations  to  health  care  plan  in  managed  care  situations);  Hans  Jonas,  Philosophical
Reflections  on  Experimenting  with  Human  Subjects,  in CONTEMPORARY I SSUES IN
BIOETHICS 432, 438 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 3d ed. 1989) (“[T]he phy-
sician is obligated to the patient and to no one else.”); William M. Sage, Some Principles
Require Principals: Why Banning “Conflicts of Interest” Won’t Solve Incentive Problems in
Biomedical  Research,  85  TEX.  L.  REV.  1413,  1416–17  (2007)  (distinguishing  traditional
“relational duties” which can cause conflicts of interests and “regulatory duties” which
cannot). But see, e.g., Stephen R. Latham, Conflict of Interest in Medical Practice, in CON-
FLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PROFESSIONS 279, 284 (Michael Davis & Andrew Stark eds.,
2001) (illustrating how doctor retained by defense may feel conflicted about not being able
to  notify  injured  plaintiff  of  potentially  lethal  condition  discovered  during  her
examination).
93 See Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest, 329 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 573, 573 (1993) (defining conflict of interest as “a set of conditions in which
professional judgment concerning a primary interest (such as a patient’s welfare or the
validity of research) tends to be unduly influenced by a secondary interest (such as finan-
cial gain)”). But see generally Sage, supra note 92 (arguing against construing “conflict of
interests” as encompassing situations without “relational duties”).
94 See also Kesselheim & Studdert, supra note 90, at 169 (describing five areas that
Code of Ethics of American Association of Neurological Surgeons (AANS) covers for
expert witness work—“personal qualifications, case research, interpretation of the stan-
dard of care, partisanship, and reimbursement”—and requirements of each area).
95 AMA CODE, supra note 91, § 9.07 (emphasis added).April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 195
expert  witness  behavior.96  Although  there  is  the  rare  enforcement
proceeding, doctors who testify for defendants, at least, seem to enjoy
almost  complete  de  facto  immunity  from  formal  discipline,  partly
because  plaintiffs  lack  the  access,  incentives,  or  even  the  right  to
pursue complaints against them.97 Some medical societies worry that
such  one-sided  enforcement  is  an  example  of  “organized  medicine
preventing physicians from testifying to the truth,”98 and commenta-
tors suggest that “the procedure appears designed to favor malprac-
tice  defendants.”99  After  all,  because  professional  associations  are
interest groups of present and potential malpractice defendants, they
are not the most credible institutions for policing expert testimony.100
Thus,  notwithstanding  the  safeguards  of  professionalism,
problems remain. As early as 1892, the Journal of the American Med-
ical  Association  editorialized  about  the  “disgraceful  exhibition  of
medical experts who are hired like horses to drive so far, and in such
and such directions, with the proper harness and appointments for one
purpose alone.”101 In surveys, experts themselves admit that they are
often “manipulated” by lawyers to provide favorable testimony.102 In
short, expert witnesses often walk a thin line between partisanship and
professionalism, and some draw the line nearer to the former than the
latter.
96 See David J. Rothman, Medical Professionalism—Focusing on the Real Issues, 342
NEW E NG. J. MED. 1284, 1284 (2000) (describing medical profession’s “record on self-
regulation”  as  “replete  with  failures”);  Joseph  Sanders,  Expert  Witness  Ethics,  76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1540 (2007) (contending that “the effectiveness of sanctions is
quite  limited”);  see  also  Gross,  supra  note  4,  at  1178  (explaining  that  although  expert
would “fear the consequences of irresponsible testimony” if she “were accountable to [her]
colleagues,” testimony “in court is generally invisible and inaudible in her own professional
world”).
97 Kesselheim & Studdert, supra note 90, at 171 (discussing American Association of
Neurological Surgeons).
98 Id. at 168 (quoting Comm. on Med. Liab., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Guidelines for
Expert  Witness  Testimony  in  Medical  Malpractice  Litigation,  109  PEDIATRICS  974,  977
(2002)).
99 Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in Med-
ical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 1002 (2004).
100 See Latham, supra note 92, at 297–98 (summarizing debate over whether professions
regulate themselves for social benefit or to promote their special interests).
101 Editorial, Expert Medical Testimony in Jury Trials, 18 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 304 (1892),
reprinted in 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1164 (1992).
102 See Daniel W. Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Wit-
nesses in the Courts—Part II: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 201 tbl.3 (1994)
(reporting 77% of experts in study believed that “[l]awyers manipulate their experts to
weaken  unfavorable  testimony  and  strengthen  favorable  testimony”);  see,  e.g.,  In  re
Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 2d 761, 771 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (noting that
expert conceded that he had, “to some extent, incorporated . . . the opinions expressed by
defense counsel”).196 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
3. Exclusion
When the experts and their professional societies themselves fail
to police bias, the courts endeavor to do so by attempting to identify
biased experts and to discount or exclude their testimony. There are
two issues to address here. First, who is to perform this screening func-
tion, and what capacities do they have for this task? Second, what
rules  or  standards  can  those  screeners  use  to  demarcate  between
biased and unbiased testimony?
As to the first question, it is clear that juries can always discount
or disregard evidence that appears unreliable, and they are instructed
to do so.103 But the exclusion solution shifts that responsibility toward
the judge.
Yet,  the  comparative  advantage  of  one  appointed  (or  elected)
lawyer  in  a  robe  versus  twelve  randomly  selected  laypersons  is  far
from obvious. As one recent article concludes, “in complicated fields
like DNA, epidemiology, or chemistry, judges are also laypersons.”104
As judges have noted, responsibility for excluding unreliable experts
gives them the “heady task” of “resolv[ing] disputes among respected,
well-credentialed scientists about matters squarely within their exper-
tise, in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to what is and
what is not ‘good science.’”105 Still, some scholars suppose that judges
can  develop  a  degree  of  special  competence  in  resolving  scientific
questions.106 Yet, we have little data about how reliably judges are
able to do so.
The current federal exclusion doctrine flows from the landmark
case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,107 which the states
103 E.g.,  3  KEVIN  F.  O’MALLEY ET AL.,  FEDERAL J URY P RACTICE  &  INSTRUCTIONS
§ 103.01 (5th ed. 2000).
104 Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 83, at 1169.
105 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.
1995) (Kozinski, J.).
106 See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 19,
44 (2007) (concluding, based on study comparing judges’ and jurors’ responses to scientific
evidence, that as result of their “more extensive exposure . . . to adversary presentations,”
judges  may  “evaluate  more  critically  the  adversarial  statements  about  the  expert  evi-
dence”). But see Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of
Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433,
444 (2001) (showing that only six percent of judges in study demonstrated clear under-
standing of concept of falsifiability, one primary Daubert criterion); James Langenfeld &
Chris Alexander, Daubert Challenges of Antitrust Experts 3 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working
Paper No. 08-06, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337081 (reviewing empirical
data that judges appear to be biased “against allowing plaintiffs’ economic experts to pro-
vide testimony in antitrust cases compared to defense experts”).
107 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150–52
(1999)  (explaining  that  Daubert’s  “gatekeeping  requirement”  applies  not  only  whereApril 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 197
increasingly follow as well.108 Under Daubert’s interpretation of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 702, an interpretation that was explicitly codi-
fied in the rules in 2000,109 expert scientific testimony is admissible if it
meets a sufficient “standard of evidentiary reliability.”110 It must be
“scientific knowledge,” meaning that it “must be derived by the scien-
tific method” or “based on scientifically valid principles.”111 This stan-
dard provides judges with considerable latitude in deciding whether to
exclude expert testimony as insufficiently “reliable” or “scientific.”112
Rule 702 instructs courts first to consider whether a witness is
“qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education”;113  and  then  to  check  that:  “(1)  the  testimony  is  based
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reli-
able principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the prin-
ciples and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”114 Arguably, Rule
702 catches the most egregious problems. Courts exclude testimony
where  an  expert  altogether  lacks  the  relevant  qualifications,  lacks
facts to back up her opinions, lacks a reliable method, or has utterly
failed to properly apply the method to the facts.115 But the Rule is
unhelpful in the great majority of cases in which an expert is qualified
but  selects  skewed  facts  and  data,  exercises  biased  judgment  in
selecting  principles  and  methods,  or  applies  the  principles  and
methods in ways that will favor her litigant-sponsor.116 Thus, a battle
experts  rely  on  scientific  principles  but  also  where  experts  give  experience-based
testimony).
108 See Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 473 & fig.1 (2005) (“[O]ver the
years a number of states have formally adopted the Daubert standard.”).
109 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (noting that amendment to rule
affirmed holding of Daubert).
110 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
111 Id. at 590, 597.
112 But see Susan Haack, Trial and Error: The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science,
95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S66, S68 (2005) (arguing that Supreme Court’s equation of “scien-
tific”  with  “reliable”  is  erroneous,  since  former  is  neither  necessary  nor  sufficient  for
latter);  Sheila  Jasanoff,  Representation  and  Re-Presentation  in  Litigation  Science,  116
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 123, 124–25 (2008) (explaining complications inherent in demar-
cating between science and non-science).
113 FED. R. EVID. 702.
114 Id.
115 See, e.g., In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 625 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(excluding  expert  medical  testimony  that  “fail[ed]  to  satisfy  the  minimum,  medically-
acceptable criteria”).
116 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d 565, 583–84 (E.D. La. 2005)
(admitting testimony of expert because he was “well qualified” and “did utilize proper
methodology,” even though his analysis was “wholly conclusive” and “littered with circular
reasoning,” explaining that “the jury will be entitled to draw its own conclusions as to how
much weight [the expert’s] opinion should be afforded”).198 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
of  hired-gun  experts  is  the  norm,  and  exclusion  “is  the  exception
rather than the rule.”117 As one scholar notes, “Rule 702 attempts to
solve the problem of adversarial bias through a reliability test, but it
leaves intact the general adversarial structure that creates the under-
lying reliability problem.”118
The thesis of this Section has been modest. Although disclosure,
expert professionalism, and exclusion may help at the margins, there
is significant room for improvement in the procedures and evidence
available to lay factfinders tasked with resolving the highly technical
disputes that are increasingly central in litigation.
D. The Unfulfilled Promise of Court-Appointment
Another potential solution to the expert bias problem is to pro-
vide  factfinders  with  unbiased  experts  that  can  reliably  signal  the
truth. Judges are the obvious persons to present such neutral experts
since judges are themselves neutral. Indeed, for more than a hundred
years, scholars have called, and continue to call, for judges to bring
nonpartisan experts into trials.119 In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence  were  amended  to  provide  explicitly  that  “[t]he  court  may
appoint  any  expert  witnesses  agreed  upon  by  the  parties,  and  may
appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.”120
There  are  two  problems  with  this  approach.  First,  there  is  the
concern that “court appointed experts [may] acquire an aura of infalli-
bility  to  which  they  are  not  entitled.”121  Second,  and  more  impor-
tantly, the approach is simply not used.
As to the first concern, one court explained, “[t]he presence of a
court-sponsored witness, who would most certainly create a strong, if
not overwhelming, impression of ‘impartiality’ and ‘objectivity,’ could
potentially  transform  a  trial  by  jury  into  a  trial  by  witness.”122  Of
course, if court-appointed experts were perfectly accurate, we might
want factfinders to give them complete deference. The problem is that
although court-appointed experts avoid the systematic biases induced
117 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
118 Bernstein, supra note 32, at 489.
119 See, e.g., Hand, supra note 1, at 56 (proposing in 1901 “a board of experts or a single
expert, not called by either side, who shall advise the jury of the general propositions appli-
cable to the case which lie within his province”); Bernstein, supra note 32, at 459 (pro-
posing in 2008 that courts “appoint nonpartisan experts to advise them on the reliability of
proffered testimony or perhaps even exclude adversarial experts and replace them with
court-appointed experts”).
120 FED. R. EVID. 706; Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1938 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
121 FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee’s note.
122 Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351, 356 (E.D. Mich. 1980).April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 199
by litigants, they may have other preexisting biases.123 Or, they may
simply err.
All error is problematic, but unrebutted error is especially so. The
adversarial system incentivizes the litigants to uncover and rebut any
errors that opposing experts make, and litigants do so by hiring their
own experts to dispute them. But with a court-appointed expert, the
judge  has  no  such  incentive.124  With  no  prior  commitment  to  a
particular outcome, the court cannot be expected to identify, much
less  fix,  its  own  expert’s  errors.125  Still,  litigants  can  try  to  correct
errors made by the judge’s expert, through cross-examination and the
testimony of their hired guns. However, a litigant and his expert will
have  a  hard  time  overcoming  the  testimony  of  a  court-appointed
expert,  given  the  disparity  in  the  credibility  of  the  two  experts.126
Because of this risk of effectively irrebuttable error, litigants rarely
request that courts appoint experts.
Second,  even  if  judges  like  the  concept  of  court-appointed
experts, they in general have declined to utilize Rule 706 in the thirty-
five years that it has been on the books. According to one survey,
judges  overwhelmingly  “view  the  appointment  of  an  expert  as  an
extraordinary activity that is appropriate only in rare instances.”127 In
the survey, fewer than one in ten federal judges reported having used
a court-appointed expert more than once in their careers, and only
123 See Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets
Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, 101–02 (1998) (discussing how “prevailing culture”
or “personal attitudes” might still bias nonpartisan experts).
124 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477, 1488 (1999) (“Since it is difficult to evaluate legal factfinding and thus to criti-
cize a judge for having made erroneous findings or praise him for good ones, the judge’s
incentive to exert himself to do a good job will be limited.”); see also Bernstein, supra note
32, at 457 n.28 (“The adversarial system . . . creates a greater incentive for each side to
conduct a thorough search for evidence . . . .”).
125 One  could  imagine  courts  appointing  multiple  experts  to  answer  each  question.
While this would indeed increase accuracy, it also would significantly increase the burden
on the court. Cf. E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches
for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 504 (1989) (explaining why science
advisory panels have not been widely used by courts).
126 To avoid this risk of erroneous but virtually irrefutable experts, courts could use jury
instructions to try to reduce the neutral experts’ influence or even withhold completely the
information that the expert was court-appointed. See Deason, supra note 123, at 131 (sug-
gesting  courts  might  use  cautionary  instructions  but  noting  “the  effectiveness  of  such
instructions [is] unknown”). However, to the extent that these efforts work to reduce the
persuasiveness of court-appointed experts, these efforts would also seem to reduce their
relative efficacy over the status quo system of adversarial experts. There seems to be no
general way to calibrate the jury’s level of reliance with the expert’s level of accuracy.
127 JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL C TR., COURT-APPOINTED
EXPERTS: DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVI-
DENCE 706, at 5 (1993).200 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
twenty percent had ever appointed even a single expert.128 A review
of California civil trials found that of the 1748 “appearances by par-
tisan  experts  in  529  cases,”  there  was  “not  a  single  reference  to  a
court-appointed expert.”129
Judges, like everyone else, are driven by deeply ingrained norms,
role  ascriptions,  and  incentive  structures.130  “[I]n  our  adversarial
system of litigation lawyers are the dominant actors. They define the
issues, assemble the evidence, and control the pace of litigation.”131
Unlike judges in inquisitorial legal systems,132 American judges may
view court-appointment of an expert as a step outside their traditional
role and an intrusion on the factfinding role of the jury.133 These roles
“encompass an entire political image of justice,”134 which is not easily
changed, even if we could agree that it were suboptimal.
Furthermore, the retention of an expert witness is no simple task.
Even  if  so  inclined,  judges  may  not  have  the  time,  expertise,  or
resources to (1) figure out what sorts of experts are needed in each of
the hundreds of cases on their dockets; (2) perform searches for quali-
fied  experts;  (3)  select  an  expert  for  each  aspect  of  each  case;  (4)
negotiate contracts with those experts; (5) educate the experts on the
predicate facts of the cases; (6) guide the experts through the process
of rendering their opinions in the form of reports; and (7) prepare the
experts  for  testimony  and  cross-examination  in  depositions  and
trial.135 The American system of justice simply does not recruit, equip,
or incentivize judges for these sorts of tasks.136 Justice Stephen Breyer
has suggested that scientific organizations could assist the courts by
128 Id. at 7–8 & tbl.1 (showing that 86 judges out of 431 surveyed had appointed at least
one expert, and only 41 had appointed more than one).
129 Gross, supra note 4, at 1191 (noting that California evidence code contains provi-
sions for court-appointed experts).
130 See Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent
Views  of  Human  Behavior  Are  Shaping  Legal  Policy, 57  EMORY  L.J.  311,  351  (2008)
(“Social psychologists have long understood that role schemas—the norms, customs, and
responsibilities that we associate with various jobs and functions—powerfully influence the
people who take on particular roles.”); see also sources cited supra note 124 (discussing
judges’ incentives).
131 Gross, supra note 4, at 1198.
132 See  Langbein,  supra  note  11,  at  835  (“In  the  Continental  tradition  experts  are
selected and commissioned by the court . . . .”).
133 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 183 (2009) (“The function of the
jury is supposed to be fact finding.”). However, this does not explain why courts still refuse
to appoint experts in bench trials. Perhaps there is a similar sense that it is improper for
judges to be influenced by anything aside from what litigants bring them.
134 Sanders, supra note 96, at 1581.
135 See Gross, supra note 4, at 1202 (“The judge has no reason to worry about the prepa-
ration of a partisan expert; that is the responsibility of the attorney who calls the witness.”).
136 See  Posner,  supra  note  124,  at  1488  (describing  challenges  of  “searcher-judge”
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performing  some  of  these  functions,137  and  they  have  indeed
attempted  to  do  so,  but  the  programs  have  “withered  for  lack  of
use.”138
One might be tempted to change Rule 706 to require judges to
appoint a neutral expert in every case, thereby moving the American
system of litigation closer to the inquisitorial model.139 Even if con-
cerns about accuracy and fairness could be set aside, it seems that such
a move is not politically feasible, since neither attorneys nor judges
support such a radical change of the American litigation system.140 It
is thus worthwhile to explore an alternative and more feasible way to
provide juries with reliable truth-signals, ideally one that self-corrects
for expert errors and is consistent with the norms of the adversarial
system.141
II
THE BLIND EXPERT
The previous Part showed that when hired-gun experts appear on
each side of a case, it is exceedingly difficult for the factfinder to dis-
cern where the truth lies. The problem remains even with mandated
disclosure,  professionalism,  exclusion,  and  the  possibility  of  court-
appointment.
137 See  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149–50 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(suggesting that scientific organizations could perform such function (citing Brief for The
New England Journal of Medicine & Marcia Angell, M.D., as Amici Curiae Supporting
Neither Petitioners Nor Respondents at 16–18, Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (No. 96-188))).
138 Deason, supra note 123, at 74, 147 (describing efforts in 1950s and 1960s to establish
structures for courts to appoint experts and their subsequent lack of use); see also Deborah
Runkle,  Court  Appointed  Scientific  Experts:  A  Demonstration  Project  of  the  American
Association for the Advancement of Science, 6 RISK DECISION & POL’Y 139 (2001) [herein-
after Runkle, CASE] (discussing structure of Court Appointed Scientific Experts (CASE)
program created by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in
order to help judges obtain independent experts); E-mail from Deborah Runkle, Project
Manager, Court Appointed Scientific Experts, to Christopher T. Robertson (Dec. 19, 2008)
(on file with the New York University Law Review) (explaining that AAAS project is no
longer  being  marketed,  has  not  received  any  requests  for  experts  recently,  and  never
achieved  high  level  of  use).  As  described  below,  this  infrastructure  could  instead  be
targeted at litigants, rather than at the courts who have chosen not to use it.
139 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 4, at 1220–30 (discussing reform options, including man-
dating use of court-appointed experts).
140 See,  e.g., Sanders,  supra  note  96,  at  1581  (observing  that  proposals  for  court-
appointed experts are resisted because they interfere with attorney control and challenge
adversarial procedures that are seen as fundamental to our image of justice). It is also
unclear how such a rule would be enforced, since the litigants likely would not object or
appeal when a judge fails to fulfill this new duty.
141 See Elliott, supra note 125, at 489 (“If we wish to change the behavior of litigants
with regard to . . . the use of experts, we must structure our procedural system so that the
incentives it creates regulate conduct by litigants in most cases without the need for discre-
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Consider the absurdity of this situation. If we believed that when
we  consulted  our  neurologists  or  our  aircraft  engineers  in  the  real
world there was only a 50/50 chance that they would provide accurate
advice, we would not call them experts at all, nor would we pay them
handsomely to cure our diseases and build our planes. Yet, that is the
story of litigation: One out of every two experts is wrong, and it is
quite difficult to tell which one.
The fact-deficit in litigation is a familiar problem for scholars, and
there have been calls for all sorts of interventions, from abandoning
the adversarial process altogether to taking the fact-finding task away
from juries.142 However, if the basic problem is that factfinders do not
get reliable truth signals because experts are biased by the litigants
who select, affiliate with, and compensate them, then the solution is
simply to eliminate those contingent factors.
This Part lays out a solution that exploits our adversarial norms
rather than tries to avoid them (as in court-appointment). Even if self-
interested litigants bring the experts to court, those experts can retain
objectivity if they render their opinions behind blinds of ignorance.
Section A explains the conceptual basis of this solution and briefly
reviews some of its precedents in philosophy, business, politics, sci-
ence, and the law. Section B articulates a pragmatic account of how
this concept could be operationalized in the adversarial system of liti-
gation with little or no changes to the rules of procedure and evidence.
Section C demonstrates how this procedure allows litigants to signal
the  facts  to  factfinders  without  degrading  the  accuracy  of  experts,
even when litigants retain control over the disclosure decision.
A. The Concept of Blinding in Justice and Science
The  concept  of  blind  decisionmaking  has  deep  roots.  Consider
Lady Justice, the icon engraved on courthouse facades and bar cards:
She stands on rocky ground, wearing a blindfold.143 The rocky ground
suggests that justice is contingent—dependent on the particulars of
142 See, e.g.,M ARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE
AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 204 (1996) (arguing that, especially in cases
involving expert witnesses, verdicts by judges “would almost certainly be sounder than
those made by juries . . . [who] are often left to make judgments largely on the basis of the
emotional appeals of the lawyers and their expert witnesses”); Paul J. Barringer et al.,
Administrative Compensation of Medical Injuries: A Hardy Perennial Blooms Again, 33 J.
HEALTH P OL.  POL’Y  &  L.  725,  745–52  (2008)  (describing  proposals  for  administrative
“health courts” as alternative to civil litigation with jury trials). See generally Struve, supra
note 99 (surveying proposed procedural reforms to medical malpractice system).
143 See David Luban, Law’s Blindfold, in CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PROFESSIONS,
supra note 92, at 23, 23 (noting blindfold is “relatively recent addition” that signifies “that
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the  world—and  the  blindfold  seems  to  concede  that  bias  is  a  real
temptation, even for Lady Justice herself. The blindfold is a practical
intervention—a  tactical  ignorance—that  protects  the  decisionmaker
from those biasing temptations.
Likewise, consider the veil of ignorance used by philosopher John
Rawls.  In  debates  about  distributive  justice,  Rawls  recognized  that
wealthy persons may tend to see wealth redistribution as unjust, while
poor persons may tend to hold that justice demands wealth redistribu-
tion.144  Each  of  these  partisans  could  then  develop  elaborate
theoretical  justifications  for  their  positions  (e.g.,  invoking  property
rights or equality of outcomes), which would then be irreconcilable
with  each  other.  Facing  this  impasse,  Rawls  turned  away  from  the
competing substantive theories and focused instead on the biased per-
spectives  of  the  deliberators.  Rawls  proposed  that  justice  could  be
ascertained in a thought experiment in which each citizen, deprived of
the knowledge of “certain things that are irrelevant from the stand-
point  of  justice,”  deliberates  with  all  other  citizens  about  the  basic
rules  of  society  from  behind  this  “veil  of  ignorance.”145  As  Rawls
poetically closed his A Theory of Justice, “Purity of heart, if one could
attain  it,  would  be  to  see  clearly  and  to  act  with  grace  and  self-
command from this point of view.”146 The idea of a veil of ignorance
has become extremely influential for political and legal theory.147
Rawls  himself  emphasized  that  his  veil  was  a  “purely
hypothetical” thought experiment.148 In the real world, we attempt to
144 RAWLS, supra note 14, at 18–19.
145 Id. Although Rawls made famous the veil of ignorance, the idea of changing the
point of view of the deliberator can be found elsewhere. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, A TREA-
TISE OF HUMAN NATURE 524 (Ernest C. Mossner ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1739) (“’Tis
only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest,
that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil.”); ADAM
SMITH, THE T HEORY OF M ORAL S ENTIMENTS 1–43 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds.,
Liberty Fund 1984) (1759) (describing “impartial spectator”); John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal
Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON.
309, 316 (1955) (describing ethical requirement of “impersonality” in which person’s pref-
erences are those he would choose if he did not know his personal position).
146 RAWLS, supra note 14, at 587.
147 See Martha Nussbaum, The Enduring Significance of John Rawls, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., July 20, 2001, at B7, B8 (discussing importance of A Theory of Justice and veil of
ignorance); see also, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law,
111 YALE L.J. 399 (2001) (exploring analysis of constitutional provisions as “veil rules”);
Russell Korobkin, Determining Health Care Rights from Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 1998
U. ILL. L. REV. 801 (using veil to argue for certain health care rights).
148 RAWLS, supra note 14, at 21. Nonetheless, Rawls argued that such an experiment has
value as an “expository device.” Id. In his early writings, Rawls conceded to a degree that
his idea underdetermined the liberal principles of distributive justice that he advocated. Id.
at 15 (“I want to maintain that . . . this situation does lead to principles of justice contrary
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merely simulate the veil of ignorance in our deliberations about justice
by trying to imagine what we would think if we had such constraints
on our knowledge. In reality, however, we cannot fully ignore “knowl-
edge of those contingencies which sets [us] at odds and allows [us] to
be guided by [our] prejudices.”149 Indeed, many scholars presume that
in public policy debates actually removing “any personal stake in the
outcome . . . is almost never practically feasible.”150
Nonetheless,  the  basic  concept  of  tactical  ignorance  has  some
real-world applications. When there is a concern that a policymaker,
judge, adviser, or auditor will be biased toward companies in which
she has financial interests, it is often best to avoid the conflict alto-
gether by eliminating her power (e.g., recusing herself from the dis-
pute)  or  eliminating  the  biasing  element  (e.g.,  divesting  from  the
asset).151  When  these  solutions  are  impracticable,  a  principal  can
instead establish a “blind trust” into which her assets are deposited.
While allowing the principal to reap the benefits of her investments,
the “blind” prevents the principal from knowing which companies she
owns  and  thus  prevents  her  from  being  biased  toward  those
companies.152
Similarly, when Bill Clinton was mired in personal legal disputes
during his presidency, donors contributed to a defense fund for his
legal expenses. To preserve the President’s impartiality, the fund made
efforts to ensure that the identities of contributors “were kept ‘secret
not only from the public, but from Clinton himself.’”153 The theory
(contrary to the norms of electoral disclosure) was that “[i]f he doesn’t
know to whom he’s beholden . . . he won’t act as if he is.”154 Legal
scholars have proposed that this notion of blind donations could be
generalized as a model for campaign financing.155
Scientists routinely use blinds. As one methodologist concludes,
“[A]ny  process  using  a  human  as  a  perceptor,  rater,  or  interpreter
149 Id. at 19.
150 Don A. Moore, Introduction to CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLU-
TIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 86, at 7.
151 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(D) (2004) (“[A] judge shall
divest himself or herself of investments and other financial interests that might require
frequent disqualification.”).
152 See,  e.g., Michael  Davis,  Introduction  to  CONFLICT OF I NTEREST IN THE P ROFES-
SIONS, supra note 92, at 12 (giving hypothetical example of how partner at auditing firm
may avoid conflicts of interest).
153 ANDREW S TARK,  CONFLICT OF I NTEREST IN A MERICAN P UBLIC L IFE  241  (2000)
(quoting Clinton aide).
154 Id.
155 See generally Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor
Anonymity To Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1998) (pro-
posing system of blind trusts for political campaign contributions).April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 205
should be ‘as blind as possible for as long as possible.’”156 Indeed, the
randomized,  controlled  “double-blind”  study  is  the  scientific  “gold
standard.”157 In such studies, subjects are randomly assigned to treat-
ment  and  control  groups  to  avoid  selection  bias.  In  a  single-blind
study, the human subjects are not informed about whether they are in
the control group (e.g., receiving a placebo) or the treatment group
(e.g., receiving the drug being tested). In a double-blind study, the
researcher is additionally prevented from knowing which subjects are
in the control group versus the experimental group. This second blind
prevents the researcher from exercising biased judgments along the
way, both in her interactions with the human subjects and in her man-
agement of the study itself.
Blinds  are  also  quite  common  in  academia.  In  most  scholarly
journals (outside of legal academia), double-blind review—where the
reviewers do not know the identity of the authors, and vice versa—is
used for article selection.158 In order to avoid possible favoritism for
particular  students,  law  professors  routinely  use  blinds  in  grading
papers.159  The  U.S.  Supreme  Court  has  specifically  pointed  to  this
grading  practice  to  demonstrate  that  it  is  possible  to  evaluate  the
quality  of  speech  even  if  it  is  anonymous,  which  was  part  of  the
Court’s  justification  of  constitutional  protection  for  anonymous
speech.160
Blinding also has potential application in the context of criminal
law.  In  forensic  science,  experts  work  in  close  collaboration  with
the  police,  which  creates  the  potential  for  biased  science.  Michael
Risinger and other scholars have called for a “wall of separation” such
156 Risinger, supra note 43, at 3 (quoting Robert Rosenthal, How Often Are Our Num-
bers Wrong?, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1005, 1007 (1978)).
157 See, e.g., TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 498 F.3d 1175, 1195 (10th Cir. 2007)
(recognizing that double-blind study is seen as gold standard in medical industry). But cf.
Ted J. Kaptchuk, The Double-Blind, Randomized, Placebo-Controlled Trial: Gold Standard
or Golden Calf?, 54 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 541, 541 (2001) (arguing that although
double-blind,  randomized,  controlled  trial  is  “gold  standard,”  complete  objectivity  in
research is impossible).
158 Richard  Snodgrass,  Single-  Versus  Double-Blind  Reviewing:  An  Analysis  of  the
Literature, 35 SIGMOD RECORD 8, 18 (Sept. 2006) (reviewing literature and concluding
that, “most scientific journals now employ double-blind reviewing”). See generally Nancy
McCormack,  Peer  Review  and  Legal  Publishing:  What  Law  Librarians  Need  To  Know
About Open, Single-Blind, and Double-Blind Reviewing, 101 LAW LIBR. J. 59 (2009) (sur-
veying types of peer review in legal journals).
159 See Paul D. Carrington, One Law: The Role of Legal Education in the Opening of the
Legal Profession Since 1776, 44 FLA. L. REV. 501, 565 (1992) (discussing history of blind
grading).
160 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 & n.5 (1995) (holding that
“an author’s decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom of speech
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that when investigators bring forensic samples into the crime lab, they
must carefully limit the information they provide to the forensic scien-
tists.161 The theory is that “[a]n examiner who does not know what
conclusion is hoped for or expected of her cannot be affected by those
considerations.”162 This proposal seems to be gaining traction amongst
forensic scientists,163 although initial steps have been halting.164
In short, the concept of blinding is already well-developed in a
variety of contexts. Blinds work as a form of tactical ignorance that
prevents conflicting interests from creating biases.
B. Operationalizing the Blind in Litigation
Although blind expertise may have application wherever experts
render opinions under potential biases, civil litigation presents a par-
ticularly  accessible  area  for  initial  study.  Court  cases  are  discrete
occurrences  with  identifiable  parties  who  have  specifiable  interests,
working in a rule-governed space. This Section explores how the blind
can be operationalized in litigation, focusing first on the roles of the
blinding intermediary and the expert, second on the role of the spon-
soring litigant exercising discretion in whether to retain and use the
expert, and finally on the role of the court in facilitating the process.
1. The Roles of the Intermediary and the Expert
The blind procedure would center on an intermediary agency that
functions as a broker between sponsors of research (e.g., plaintiffs)
and potential expert witnesses (e.g., doctors). The intermediary would
be set up as a generalized infrastructure, not created on an ad hoc
basis  for  particular  cases.  For  now,  assume  that  there  would  be  a
single intermediary for all cases, such as the American Association for
the  Advancement  of  Science  (AAAS),  that  would  be  truly  neutral
with regard to the outcome of any case and would be accredited by
the  courts  to  ensure  quality  and  to  minimize  the  need  for  ex  post
monitoring. Indeed, the AAAS has already created such an infrastruc-
ture for judges to use in selecting neutral experts, though it has lan-
161 Risinger, supra note 41, at 45; see also Moriarty & Saks, supra note 46, at 27–28
(describing biases of expectation and suggestion in forensic science).
162 Risinger, supra note 41, at 45.
163 See Risinger, supra note 43, at 2 (quoting National Academy of Sciences report that
calls for “standard operating procedures . . . to minimize, to the greatest extent reasonably
possible, potential bias and sources of human error in forensic practice”).
164 See Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science and Capital Punishment Reform: An “Intellec-
tually Honest” Assessment, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 299, 384 n.400 (2007) (“Until
the forensic science community is better funded, it is safe to say [Risinger’s] suggestions
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guished for lack of use.165 The infrastructure could be retooled for
litigants’ use instead.166
Alternatively,  other  not-for-profit  or  for-profit  agencies  could
provide  blinding  services  for  litigants.  For  the  model  to  be  viable,
however, the intermediary will need to aggressively maintain indepen-
dence from the litigants, so as to avoid biases and signal to factfinders
that it has done so. An advisory or governance board, consisting of
plaintiffs’ lawyers, defense lawyers, scientists, and judges may help in
this regard.
The blind process would be initiated by a litigant, who would con-
tact the intermediary and request an expert opinion on at least one
aspect  of  his  or  her  case,  such  as  specific  causation  or  damages.
Although this service could be partially or completely subsidized by
the government (for the purpose of improving the legal system), let us
proceed on the assumption that it would be fee-based and that the
intermediary would require the litigant to pay the intermediary’s fee
and the expert’s fee, both in advance, before learning of the expert’s
identity or opinion. The intermediary would then provide two blinds:
(1) a blind for litigants in retaining experts without selection bias, and
(2) a blind for experts to render opinions without affiliation and com-
pensation biases. Consider these functions in more detail.
First, the intermediary would select, through an unbiased mecha-
nism, an expert that is qualified to render an opinion on the case. By
avoiding selection bias, the sampled opinion will more likely be repre-
sentative of the body of expert opinions than is the case under the
status  quo,  where  the  hand-picked  experts  likely  come  from  the
extreme poles of expert opinions.
Prior  to  the  selection,  the  litigant  would  identify  the  field  of
expertise  and  specify  certain  objective  parameters  for  the  desired
expert (e.g., must be a board-certified neurologist and cost no more
than $500 per hour). The sponsor could also identify additional cri-
teria to avoid experts who may be already biased, for example, by
previous interaction with the litigants.167 Any such screening criteria
will be subject to later impeachment by the adversary to ensure that
165 See sources cited supra note 138 (discussing these efforts).
166 Under the status quo, there are also already agencies that provide expert brokerages
for litigants, but apparently none attempt to eliminate litigant-induced biases. See Jonathan
D. Glater, More and More, Expert Witnesses Make the Difference, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2005, at C7 (describing “The Round Table Group” as one agency that “refers lawyers to
experts  of  all  sorts  in  its  65,000-person  database”  and  “is  paid  if  one  of  its  experts  is
hired”).
167 See Runkle, CASE, supra note 138, at 142 (describing efforts to prescreen court-
appointed experts on employment history, financial interests, and affiliations, and to limit
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they are not pretexts for biasing the selection, and the intermediary
may also limit the types of screens allowed in order to preserve the
integrity of the blinding process.168 Finally, potential experts should be
required to precommit to testify for either side as the facts warrant.
After screening on these criteria, the intermediary would then select
one of the qualified experts for an initial review of the case.
There are two ways that the intermediary could impartially select
an expert. One way would be through random selection from a roster
of qualified experts. This procedure would be most efficient in a con-
text such as medical malpractice, where there is a significant amount
of litigation and where there are potentially thousands of potential
experts who would be qualified to opine on the standard of care. The
advantage  of  this  approach  is  that  the  roster  could  be  created  in
advance based on purely objective criteria (e.g., including all those
who are board certified neurologists in a jurisdiction and willing to be
called as a witness). This method would allow for economies of scale,
thus making it the less expensive option.
Alternatively, the blind expert could be hand-picked by the inter-
mediary, using both objective and subjective criteria. To prevent such
discretion from leading to a pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant bias, the
intermediary could be bifurcated, separating the staff who deal with
the  attorneys  from  those  who  select  and  deal  with  the  experts.
Accordingly,  the  person  selecting  the  expert  would  be  unaware  of
whether the plaintiff or defendant was requesting the opinion. This
approach would be necessary in fields where litigation is more rare or
where  the  required  expertise  is  extremely  specialized,  making  it
impracticable  to  create  a  roster  ex  ante.  An  advantage  of  this
approach is that the intermediary could use some discretion and select
experts with superior credentials and teaching abilities, who might be
particularly persuasive at trial.
Second,  the  intermediary  would  blind  the  experts  to  minimize
affiliation and compensation biases. The intermediary would develop
and assign the expert’s question, provide the expert with a dossier of
the necessary materials to review, and pay the expert, all without the
expert knowing the identity or interests of the sponsoring litigant.169
168 For example, the intermediary may need to monitor whether there is a correlation
between fees charged and substantive opinions rendered, so that experts and sponsors are
not able to signal to each other through their offers and demands and thereby create a
selection bias.
169 The expert will likely still be able to make generalized inferences in many cases. For
example, a judgment that a doctor made a mistake that caused an injury would almost
certainly benefit the plaintiff in any medical malpractice litigation. These sorts of “residual
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A  key  challenge  at  this  stage  will  be  for  the  intermediary  to
develop an unbiased litigation question and a dossier of the necessary
predicate  facts  for  the  expert  to  review—one  that  is  complete  yet
redacted of any biasing information. This stage will be self-policing to
some extent because the adversary will eventually see that same dos-
sier  and  will  be  able  to  impeach  and  undermine  the  blind  expert’s
opinion if it was based on a skewed or incomplete set of predicate
facts—indeed,  the  blind  expert  may  even  change  his  opinion  upon
learning the other side of the story.170 In addition, the intermediary
should encourage the expert to specify any other information that she
needs to see (e.g., the results of a blood test mentioned in the records)
before rendering her opinion.
After receiving the dossier and research question, the expert will
record  her  opinion  in  a  structured  report,  affirming  that  she  has
received  all  information  necessary  to  render  a  final  and  complete
opinion. The report will disclose all the factors she considered and
relied upon and will specify a confidence level for her opinions. The
intermediary will check that the expert’s report is explicit, concrete,
and complete; and if so, it will pay the expert for her time regardless
of the substance of her opinion. The intermediary will then incorpo-
rate  into  the  expert’s  report  information  about  how  many  blind
experts  the  sponsoring  litigant  consulted  and  how  the  blinds  were
implemented. Thereafter, the intermediary will convey the combined
report to the sponsoring litigant.
2. The Role of the Litigant
When the sponsoring litigant receives the expert’s report, he will
assess  its  usefulness.  The  sponsor’s  assessment  of  the  report  will
depend  on  the  substance  and  tenor  of  the  expert’s  opinions,  along
with the credentials of the expert and any other factors that may affect
her persuasiveness at trial. On net, the litigant will determine whether
or not this opinion is likely to be favorable for improving the value of
his case, or whether it will instead be useless or harmful all things
considered. Thus, the litigant transforms a complicated question into a
binary one (usable or not usable).
Through careful application of the rules of disclosure and discov-
erability, the blind procedure protects the litigant’s ability to make
this choice. The goals are twofold: (1) to minimize the ex ante risk to
170 A litigant confident in the scientific merits of his case could inoculate his blind expert
from this sort of challenge by first asking the adversary to provide any predicate facts that
he wanted included or to review and object to the intermediary if any biasing information
was included. Failure by the adversary to do so would presumably waive any objection at
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the litigant of using the blind procedure, and (2) to give the factfinder
ex post the information it needs to assess whether the blind expert is
truly free of bias. This Section argues that, when applied to the blind
procedure, the current rules of disclosure, discoverability, and work
product protection appropriately strike this balance.
Under the attorney work product doctrine, if a litigant consults
with an expert but does not designate her as a trial witness, then the
expert’s opinions are generally not discoverable by the adversary.171
The rationale for work product protection is to permit an attorney to
“assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from
the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy
without undue and needless interference,” allowing him “to promote
justice and to protect [his] clients’ interests.”172 There is no reason
why  this  privilege  would  not  apply  to  a  consulting,  non-testifying
expert simply because she rendered her opinions from behind a blind.
Therefore, if a litigant commissions a blind expert to render an
opinion and it turns out to be unfavorable, then the opinion will not
be discoverable by the adversary. Accordingly, when a blind opinion
turns out to be unfavorable, the sponsoring party has lost only the cost
of  the  initial  opinion  (perhaps  a  few  thousand  dollars).  The  blind
expert’s opinion cannot hurt the sponsor. This is a critical point that
will make the procedure attractive to rational litigants, and particu-
larly attractive compared to court-appointed experts, for whom the
disclosure decision is out of the litigants’ control.
On the other hand, if the blind expert’s opinion is favorable to
the sponsoring litigant, then the litigant can retain the expert for testi-
mony. If the litigant does so, she must disclose the expert and her
report to the adversary, just as in normal litigation.173 As noted above,
171 According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26:
[A] party may not . . . discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who
has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of
litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness
at trial. But a party may do so . . . on showing exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions on the same
subject by other means.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) (emphasis added). As Samuel Gross notes:
A party that takes full advantage of these [discovery] rules can “informally
consult”  with  a  dozen  experts  (a  non-discoverable  activity),  retain  the  five
experts who seem most promising (a generally non-discoverable activity), and,
finally, at the last available date, designate the one of these five whose opinion
is most favorable as an expert witness . . . .
Gross, supra note 4, at 1143.
172 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). See generally Sidney I. Schenkier, The
Limits of Privilege in Communications with Experts, LITIGATION, Winter 2007, at 16 (dis-
cussing development and complications of work product doctrine as it relates to experts).
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the report would include the intermediary’s disclosures about how the
blind procedure was implemented, which should then help persuade
the factfinder that the blind expert is entitled to extra credibility. The
adversary would test the robustness of the procedure, rendering the
process largely self-policing.
To  ensure  that  sponsoring  litigants  do  not  create  an  iterative
selection bias by making multiple requests for blind opinions, litigants
who do designate a blind expert for testimony would be required to
disclose how many blind experts (in that same field) they consulted
before  selecting  one.174  Indeed,  as  noted  above,  this  information
would  be  included  in  the  intermediary’s  report  with  each  expert
opinion. Of course this sort of disclosure is not required under the
status quo. For the blind procedure, the disclosure requirement would
arise from either of two existing exceptions to the work product doc-
trine.  First,  an  opposing  litigant  could  assert  an  “at  issue”  implied
waiver  of  work  product  protection.  The  litigant  that  brings  a  blind
expert, and thereby claims a lack of selection bias, cannot at the same
time avoid discovery into selection bias.175 Likewise, the potential for
a litigant to claim falsely that there was no selection bias would be an
“exceptional  circumstance”  allowing  discovery  under  the  Federal
Rules.176 It is worth emphasizing that it is not the litigant’s decision to
174 See Posner, supra note 124, at 1541 (suggesting disclosure of names of all experts
approached by attorneys as possible witnesses to “alert the jury to the problem of ‘witness
shopping’”). In practice, having to solicit and pay for multiple blind opinions may make
that technique cost- or time-prohibitive, even aside from the discovery rule. Moreover, if
blind experts have a high degree of accuracy, it would be unlikely that multiple random
draws would pay off for a party advocating against the truth. Thus, the disclosure rule may
not be strictly necessary, though it would prevent an inefficient arms-race.
175 See  United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239–40 (1975) (“The privilege derived
from the work-product doctrine is not absolute. Like other qualified privileges, it may be
waived. . . . Respondent, by electing to present the investigator as a witness, waived the
privilege  with  respect  to  matters  covered  in  his  testimony.  Respondent  can  no  more
advance the work-product doctrine to sustain a unilateral testimonial use of work-product
materials than he could elect to testify in his own behalf and thereafter assert his Fifth
Amendment privilege to resist cross-examination on matters reasonably related to those
brought out in direct examination.”); FED. R. EVID. 502 (extending waiver of attorney
work product protections to undisclosed information “only if: (1) the waiver is intentional;
(2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject
matter; and (3) they ought in fairness to be considered together”); cf.  United States v.
Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that attorney-client privilege “may
implicitly be waived when defendant asserts a claim that in fairness requires examination
of protected communications”); Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1637 (1985) (“It has become a well-accepted component of waiver
doctrine that a party waives his privilege if he affirmatively pleads a claim or defense that
places at issue the subject matter of privileged material over which he has control.”).
176 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) (allowing disclosure in “exceptional circumstances”); see
also In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 2d 761, 765, 768–69 (N.D. Ohio
2008) (holding that party that brings scholarly treatises into court under hearsay exception212 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
purchase a blind opinion that pierces attorney work product protec-
tions; it is only the subsequent decision to designate a blind expert for
testimony that does so.
Ex ante knowledge of this disclosure rule would generally deter
litigants from iterative use of the blind procedure. For a litigant, there
is little value in bringing a favorable blind opinion if he also must dis-
close  the  existence  of  one  or  more  unfavorable  blind  opinions;  he
would be better off resorting to traditional unblind experts or settling
the case. Indeed, if an initial opinion is unfavorable, each subsequent
attempt to secure an opinion will promise diminishing returns, both in
the likelihood of the next opinion being favorable and in the persua-
siveness to the factfinder of any favorable opinion received.
Thus, for simplicity, assume that each litigant will make at most
one attempt to secure a blind expert (for each type of expert in a
case). Of course, both sides in the litigation may hire blind experts,
but because the experts are rendering unbiased opinions, and presum-
ably have some skill in assessing the truth, they will tend to agree.
Thus, it will often be the case that only one side will have a favorable
blind expert at trial, which will presumably give that side of a credi-
bility advantage.177
It is also important to specify when and how the blind will be
lifted. If the opinion is favorable to the sponsor, the litigant will retain
the expert, designate him for testimony, and lift the blind prior to the
expert’s deposition by the adversary. The litigant will pay the expert
for  subsequent  work—including  depositions,  trial  preparation,  and
testimony—based on a prearranged fee schedule. One might worry
that such affiliation and compensation will create the very biases that
the blind sought to avoid, but the expert’s initial opinions are already
locked-in in her disclosed report, written before she ever learns of her
sponsor. As such, subsequent biases will be significantly (albeit not
entirely) mitigated. Experts will presumably tend to stick to their ini-
tial opinions (as the anchoring heuristic would predict), even when
their sponsors try to bias them toward even more favorable extremes.
If an expert does change her testimony, the adversary will use her
initial report to impeach her on cross-examination.
puts lack of bias in treatise at issue, and “extraordinary circumstance” exception makes
discoverable any work product that shows payments made to authors).
177 Cf. Posner, supra note 124, at 1538 (“If market incentives kept experts fully honest,
defendants’ lawyers would often not introduce expert testimony at all, because they would
find it difficult to locate a reputable expert who would contradict the plaintiff’s expert.”).April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 213
3. The Role of the Court
The blind procedure is designed to work within existing institu-
tions and procedures, requiring no major changes to substantive or
procedural law. Still, there are a few measures that the courts should
take to ensure that the blind procedure is workable.
First, the courts should make it a safe choice for litigants. I have
shown that the current doctrine of work product protection should
allow a litigant to consult a blind expert without risk of an adverse
opinion hurting his case. Courts must adhere strictly to this interpreta-
tion of the doctrine and signal their intention to do so, perhaps by
amending the federal or local rules of procedure. It will be important
for  litigants  to  know  that  not  only  will  adverse  blind  opinions  be
nondiscoverable by the adversary, but also that the very fact that a
blind expert was consulted will be protected from discovery.178 In this
way, litigants can be reassured that the worst-case scenario under the
new procedure is that a blind opinion will be unusable.
Second, the courts should make the blind procedure attractive for
litigants by allowing those who use blind experts at trial to use hired-
gun experts as well. A blind expert will have additional credibility due
to his lack of biases, but a hired gun may have other advantages, such
as  credentials,  teaching  skills,  and  the  ability  to  stand  up  to  tough
cross-examination. The court should not force a litigant to choose. By
allowing both types of experts on the same side, the court improves
the  ex  ante  incentives  for  litigants  to  use  the  blind  procedure.
Although an adversary may object that the additional expert is cumu-
lative and therefore wastes time, the Federal Rules explicitly provide
that  when  a  court-appointed  expert  offers  testimony,  this  does  not
preclude  litigants  from  also  offering  their  own  hand-selected
experts.179 The same should be true for the blind procedure. In this
way, factfinders can get the best of both worlds: persuasive advocates
from both sides and an objective assessment of the truth.
178 If the opinion itself is nondiscoverable, there is no purpose in allowing discovery of
the predicate fact that an expert was consulted but not called to testify, which would only
create an adverse inference about that same opinion. Many (perhaps most) courts already
protect not just the consulting experts’ opinions but also their identities and the fact of
their retention. See, e.g., Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training Sch. for Nurses, 622
F.2d 496, 503 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that “the identity, and other collateral information
concerning an expert who is retained or specially employed in anticipation of litigation, but
not expected to be called as a witness at trial, is not discoverable” except per exceptions in
Rule 26(b)); Cooper v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 1997 WL 289706 at *1 (E.D. La. May 28,
1997) (describing this as predominant view among courts).
179 FED. R. EVID. 706(d) (“Nothing in this rule limits the parties in calling expert wit-
nesses of their own selection.”).214 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
Third, the courts should ensure that the blind procedure is robust
and that litigants can present it effectively at trial. Adversaries will
want to conduct discovery about the procedures used to select and
communicate with a blind expert, and the court should allow these to
some extent. However, courts should also be mindful of the need to
minimize the burden on the intermediary.180 In order to streamline
the trial, courts may wish to handle these issues in the pretrial hear-
ings (which are often required anyway to assess the admissibility of
expert testimony under Daubert). Unless the court determines that
there is a genuine issue about the quality of the blind, it would be a
waste of trial time to pursue these issues. Once the court has made a
preliminary  determination  that  the  blind  procedure  was  properly
implemented, the blind expert should be presented to the jury as such,
with only limited cross-examination on those procedural points.
Fourth,  courts  should  assist  juries  in  understanding  the  differ-
ences between blind experts and traditional experts. Currently, courts
explicitly instruct jurors to consider the biases of expert witnesses.181
When a blind expert appears in trial, courts should issue a jury instruc-
tion  that  conveys  the  concept  of  blind  expertise  and  explains  why
these  experts  may  merit  special  consideration  as  compared  to  the
other experts who were hand-selected by litigants and subject to affili-
ation and compensation biases.
There are many details to be worked out before implementing
this procedure, including how blinds (of the litigant and of the expert)
can  be  made  both  robust  against  manipulation  and  transparent  to
adversaries, as well as how the experts can be compensated for their
work without introducing other biases. Part V.C returns to address
some of these details.
C. The Blind Procedure as Truth-Signal
This Section demonstrates that when one side in litigation uses a
blind expert, that expert will be much more accurate than status quo
unblind  experts  and  just  as  accurate  as  a  court-appointed  expert
would be. A probabilistic model of expert accuracy further demon-
strates  that  when  both  adversaries  use  the  blind  procedure,  the
180 If there are multiple competing intermediaries, more such discovery may be appro-
priate. If there is instead a single accredited and credible intermediary that is regularly
monitored, such discovery could be limited.
181 The Fifth Circuit’s pattern instruction, for example, is the following: “In deciding
whether to accept or rely upon the opinion of an expert witness, you may consider any bias
of the witness, including any bias you may infer from evidence that the expert witness has
been or will be paid for reviewing the case and testifying . . . .” O’MALLEY ET AL., supra
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method  enhances  accuracy  almost  exponentially.  This  Section  then
provides a mathematical illustration of the argument.
1. Accuracy of Blind Experts
Suppose that there is a scientific proposition that is either true or
false, such as the claim that a specified dose of some chemical causes a
given disease (general causation). Now, suppose that when assessing
such  propositions,  experts  in  their  laboratories,  clinics,  and  offices
outside of litigation err at some “base rate” that is better (lower) than
fifty percent.182 For example, we might suppose that this base error
rate is equal to five percent in some particular field of expertise.183
Now suppose that this same scientific proposition is the central ques-
tion in a litigated case. As described in Part I.B, status quo litigants
will use selection and other biases to increase the error rates of their
expert witnesses to fifty percent, at least on their binary bottom-line
opinions about the proposition. In contrast, blind experts, who are not
subject to these biases, retain their base rates of error (again, say five
percent).  Thus,  while  blind  experts  will  still  be  fallible,  juries  can
expect that they will be much more accurate—and thus much more
credible—than unblind experts.
Nonetheless, one might worry that the work-product protections
described above, which allow litigants to decide whether to bring blind
experts to the jury only after learning of the substance of those opin-
ions, will undermine the accuracy of blind experts. Recall that the dis-
closure rules described in Part II.B.2 effectively limit the litigant to a
single blind expert. As I will demonstrate mathematically below, the
litigants’ discretion about whether to disclose opinions only reduces
the frequency with which blind experts appear before factfinders. Like
a treatise or a scientific instrument, the expert’s opinion is what it is,
and the litigant’s subsequent decision to show it or not show it does
not decrease the accuracy of the source itself. Thus, individual blind
experts retain their base rates of accuracy in litigation.
Now, consider the accuracy of blind experts when both adversa-
ries use the procedure independently. The “adversarial blind” (as this
condition can be called) enhances accuracy even further, because it
182 Cf. Deason, supra note 123, at 101–16 (describing sources of expert error other than
those caused by adversarial biases).
183 Other ex ante error rates for blind experts are considered in the Appendix, infra.
The five percent rate is a decent place to start, since it corresponds to the threshold for
statistical significance used in the social sciences and is widely used in law. See, e.g., Coser
v. Moore, 739 F.2d 746, 754 n.3 (2d Cir. 1984) (accepting five percent “probability of occur-
ring  by  pure  chance”  as  benchmark  for  statistical  significance  and  as  “measure  of
validity”). But see Posner, supra note 124, at 1511 (“The five percent convention is rooted
in considerations that have no direct relevance to litigation . . . .”).216 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
generates two independent unbiased expert assessments of the facts,
rather than one. This effect is related to Condorcet’s Jury Theorem.184
In  the  vast  majority  of  cases,  both  experts  will  agree  on  a  truthful
opinion, but only one side will find the opinion favorable and there-
fore  disclose  her  blind  expert.  In  the  rarer  cases,  when  one  blind
expert errs, her opinion will usually be contradicted by the adversary’s
expert, and neither or both will be disclosed to the factfinder. Only in
the rarest cases will both experts err, resulting in an erroneous unre-
butted opinion being disclosed to the factfinder. Thus, blind experts
deserve great deference by factfinders, and courts should be reassured
that  when  a  blind  expert  appears,  Daubert  screening  and  court-
appointed experts will be largely unnecessary to assure the validity of
courtroom science.185
2. A Mathematical Illustration
For an illustration of the fact-signaling function of the blind pro-
cedure, imagine a simplified case in which the only scientific question
is whether a doctor met the standard of care in his treatment of the
patient, and assume that the truth is on the plaintiff’s side (i.e., the
doctor was negligent). Each party will use the intermediary to retain
one blind expert to review the case and will bring the expert to trial
only  if  her  opinion  is  favorable.  Litigants  with  unfavorable  blind
expert  opinions  will  hide  them  and  proceed  to  trial  with  unblind
experts instead. For now, assume that randomly selected and unbiased
experts render opinions with an error rate of five percent. Given all
these assumptions, each box in Table 1 represents a hypothetical trial
outcome.186
184 See Adrian Vermeule, Foreword, System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 13 (2009) (“In the simplest possible form, the Theorem states that where a group
votes sincerely on two alternatives, one of which is correct, and the members of the group
are even slightly more likely to be right than wrong, then as the number of members in the
group increases, the probability that a majority vote of the group is correct tends toward
certainty.”); see also Koppl et al., supra note 26, at 146 (describing similar phenomenon
with experts whose accuracy is function of their numbers).
185 For a more extended discussion of this point, see infra Part V.A.
186 For now, set aside the potential for the parties to avert trial by settling, since any
such settlement would be made in the light of these hypothetical trial outcomes anyway.April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 217
TABLE 1
ACCURACY OF BLIND EXPERTS AS FACT-SIGNALS
Defendant’s Blind Expert Defendant’s Blind Expert
says “no malpractice,” so says “malpractice,” so
Defendant discloses. Defendant hides.
(5%) (95%)
Plaintiff’s Blind Expert One Blind Expert No Blind Experts says “no malpractice,” so (False Signal) (No Signal) Plaintiff hides. Odds: 0.25% Odds: 4.75% (5%)
Plaintiff’s Blind Expert Two Blind Experts One Blind Expert says “malpractice,” so (No Signal) (True Signal) Plaintiff discloses. Odds: 4.75% Odds: 90.25% (95%)
Consider each outcome. In the top right scenario (4.75% of the
time), a meritorious plaintiff retains a blind expert but unfortunately
has a blind expert that renders a wrong opinion. The defendant’s blind
expert correctly informs the defendant that the plaintiff should win
this case, so the defendant does not disclose the opinion. As a result,
both sides suppress their blind experts and the trial will involve tradi-
tional unblind experts; this is no worse than the case of traditional
litigation (though money will be wasted). In the bottom left scenario
(4.75%  of  the  time),  the  situation  is  reversed;  both  parties  get
favorable opinions, and the jury is faced with a blind expert on each
side. In these two situations where the blind experts disagree, the pro-
cedure sends no signal.
The  signals  are  in  the  top  left  and  bottom  right  quadrants.  In
these two boxes, both experts agree, but the jury only hears from one
of them. Because one side’s opinion is unfavorable to it, that side pro-
ceeds (if at all) with a traditional, unblind expert. Thus, 90.25% of the
time, the jury will hear from a blind expert supporting the true side,
and 0.25% of the time,it will hear from a blind expert on the false side.
So, if there are 400 cases in which the adversarial blind procedure
is used on the foregoing assumptions, there will be 38 cases in which
the procedure sends no signal, 361 cases in which the blind procedure
sends a true signal, and only one case in which it sends a false signal.
Thus, of the 362 cases in which the procedure sends a signal, only one
of  those  will  be  a  false  signal,  giving  the  procedure  a  0.28%  error
rate.187 As such, one can see that allowing litigants to hide unfavor-
able opinions does not hurt accuracy. Rather, the adversarial blind
187 See equation (1) and Table 5 in the Appendix, infra, for further elaboration on this
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procedure improves the accuracy of experts, reducing their error rates
from 5% to 0.28%. This is a significant advantage of the adversarial
blind procedure, compared to court-appointment using single experts
with  5%  error  rates.  And  of  course,  a  0.28%  error  rate  for  blind
experts is much better than the 50% error rate of traditional litigation
experts. Thus, a blind expert deserves very strong deference by the
factfinder.
Still, the blind procedure only eliminates certain litigant-induced
biases; it does not somehow guarantee truth. Until now, we have pos-
tulated that blind experts will err five percent of the time in their ini-
tial opinions, but this is a relatively arbitrary assumption. The true
rate will vary across scientific disciplines and across particular cases.
However, the basic conclusions—that blind experts are more reliable
than  court-appointed  and  traditional  experts—hold  as  long  as  the
expert error rate is less than 50% (random chance). For example, even
at a 25% ex ante error rate, the blind procedure sends signals to juries
62.5%  of  the  time,  and  the  signals  will  be  accurate  90%  of  those
times.188
It is noteworthy that as the ex ante error rate increases, it creates
more situations in which two blind experts disagree, and thus the blind
procedure becomes less attractive as an investment for litigants. This
is because the procedure sends no signal when the two experts disa-
gree, yet litigants still have to pay for the initial opinions. Thus, liti-
gants have the greatest incentives to hire blind experts on questions
for which they believe the experts are highly accurate. And, of course,
litigants who know that the truth is favorable will be most likely to
commission blind opinions in the first place. This incentive structure
should  further  reassure  factfinders  of  the  reliability  of  the  blind
experts that do appear in court.
With regard to accuracy, it is also important to emphasize that the
proposed blind procedure would require experts to disclose degrees of
confidence in their reports, and the adversaries will presumably draw
special attention to these disclosures when the confidence is low. Such
disclosure is valuable in three ways. First, adversaries will use these
disclosures  to  ensure  that  experts  do  not  become  more  strident  in
their opinions once they learn of their sponsors. Second, the confi-
dence  levels  allow  the  factfinders  to  calibrate  their  reliance.  If  the
blind experts are accurate in their assessments of confidence in their
own  opinions,  then  opinions  rendered  with  low  confidence  deserve
188 See the Appendix, infra, for more detailed mathematical analysis. Table 5 shows the
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less deference.189 Third, rational litigants may choose to discard some
favorable opinions in which the expert discloses low confidence, or the
courts may exclude them if they lack a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty. This screening increases the accuracy of blind experts that
appear at trial.190
Overall  then,  the  blind  procedure  provides  a  valuable  truth
signal. Blind experts are clearly more reliable than status quo hired-
gun experts, regardless of whether one or both of the litigants try the
procedure. If both litigants try the procedure, it becomes a particu-
larly reliable signal of the truth, more accurate than court-appointed
experts. Thus, if factfinders followed them, blind experts would likely
improve the accuracy of the legal system, helping it better serve its
goals  of  deterrence,  compensation,  and,  when  appropriate,
punishment.
III
BLIND EXPERTISE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
Medical  malpractice  litigation  (“med-mal”)  provides  a  useful
domain for modeling the blind procedure. Expert witnesses play an
especially important role in med-mal cases, as litigants generally must
bring at least one expert to testify as to whether the defendant met the
standard of care.191 Moreover, some commentators argue that judges
in  med-mal  perform  a  less  rigorous  gatekeeping  function.192  Thus,
blind experts may be especially helpful in this context if they provide
better truth signals to factfinders.
Section A uses some data about med-mal litigation to model the
potential utility of the blind procedure. Section B explains why one
might expect blind experts to be particularly valuable in med-mal liti-
gation for articulating the standard of care, which is usually defined in
terms of customary practice. It also addresses the concern that med-
mal experts may be subject to unusually strong biases to protect fellow
189 Some evidence suggests that experts will be accurate in these self-assessments. See
David M. Studdert & Michelle M. Mello, When Tort Resolutions Are “Wrong”: Predictors
of Discordant Outcomes in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 36 J. LEGAL S TUD. S47, S57
(2007) (explaining that when independent reviewers of medical malpractice cases disclosed
lower levels of confidence, they in fact tended to show less agreement with each other,
which  thus  suggests  less  reliability).  But  see  infra  Part  V.C.2  (discussing  potential  bias
toward extremes or higher confidence).
190 On the other hand, litigants are also more likely to settle cases that have very confi-
dent blind experts, and thus juries may not see those cases.
191 Gary T. Schwartz, Empiricism and Tort Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1067, 1071.
192 E.g., Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking
Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 707 (2002) (describing judges’ “laissez-
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professionals from liability. Finally, Section C compares the blind pro-
cedure to other proposals for med-mal reform.
A. Modeling the Potential Impact of the Blind Procedure
Medical malpractice is one of the most studied areas of litigation,
so we thankfully have data to drive our analysis. In one major study,
David Studdert and Michelle Mello examined 1452 closed malpractice
claims—fifteen percent of which were decided by trial verdict—from
five insurers. They used a team of disinterested physicians to deter-
mine  whether  or  not  medical  error  had  occurred  in  each  case
(arguably  the  “truth”),  and  they  compared  those  assessments  with
whether or not the insurer paid each claim (the “outcome”).193 They
were  looking  for  “discordant  outcomes”—payments  in  cases  where
the independent reviewers concluded that there was actually no mal-
practice, and nonpayment in cases where the reviewers found genuine
malpractice.194 Studdert and Mello were operating under the assump-
tion that when an independent physician reviews a case and disagrees
with a jury that heard from two hired guns, the independent physi-
cians  are  right  and  the  jury  is  wrong.195  Although  reasonable,  this
assumption would seem to be impossible to prove. While accepting
Studdert and Mello’s descriptive claims for the sake of analysis, the
prescriptive  and  predictive  portion  of  this  Article  proceed  on  the
more  conservative  assumption  that  when  two  independent  experts
193 Studdert & Mello, supra note 191, at S53–S58. Of course, the Studdert and Mello
analysis joins the legal system and this Article in presuming that there is an actual truth in
each  of  these  cases,  a  truth  that  the  jury  is  either  hitting  or  missing.  See  id.  at  S48
(describing inaccuracy of tort system in which malpractice claims are rightly decided only
75% of the time). This presumption gains some support from the fact that the independent
reviewers assessed only 23% of the cases as “close calls,” id. at S59, and that interrater
reliability was “substantial.” Id. at S57; see also supra Part I.A (explaining assumption of
actual truth); infra Part V.B (loosening that assumption).
194 Studdert  &  Mello,  supra  note  191,  at  S57.  Studdert  &  Mello’s  reviewers  were
instructed to look for “medical error” (as defined by the Institute of Medicine) rather than
“malpractice.” “In theory, [error] is not synonymous with the legal concept of negligence,
which  is  the  focus  of  the  malpractice  system.”  Id.  at  S72.  While  acknowledging  this
theoretical distinction, I nonetheless use the term “malpractice” so as to distinguish mis-
takes  made  by  defendants  (“malpractice”)  and  those  made  by  experts  and  juries
(“errors”). Also, while Studdert and Mello’s working definition of “medical error” is based
on  the  National  Institute  of  Medicine’s  standard—which  defines  a  medical  error  as  a
failure of planning or a failure of execution, id. (citing IOM REPORT, supra  note 24)—
there is some debate over whether experts can reliably determine causation, which is an
essential element of a legal claim of malpractice. See Troyen A. Brennan, The Institute of
Medicine Report on Medical Errors—Could It Do Harm?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1123,
1123  (2000)  (asserting  that  “there  is  no  evidence  that  such  judgments  can  be  made
reliably”).
195 This analysis depends on the discussion in Part I, supra, which showed why counter-
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review a case and both agree with each other but disagree with a jury
deciding on the basis of two hired guns, the two independent experts
are right and the jury is wrong.
Although Studdert and Mello’s independent reviewers found that
nearly two-thirds of the cases in the insurer’s database involved gen-
uine malpractice (and 44% of those that went to trials involved gen-
uine  malpractice)  plaintiffs  won  far  fewer  cases  than  they  should
have.196 Studdert and Mello concluded that “[r]esolution [of a case] by
trial  verdict  was  the  single  strongest  predictor  of  nonpayment  of  a
meritorious claim.”197
TABLE 2
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS REPORTED IN
STUDDERT & MELLO (2005)198
Truth* Jury Outcomes
Malpractice
91 Plaintiff wins 39
(43%)
(44%) Defendant wins** 52
(57%)
No Malpractice
117 Plaintiff wins** 11
(9%)
(56%) Defendant wins 106
(91%)
Accuracy of Outcomes 70%
(145/208)
* According to disinterested reviewers
** Discordant outcome
Table 2 shows these disparities for the 208 cases that went to trial.
Ideally, once a trial has reached the jury stage, plaintiffs should win in
all cases in which there was real medical malpractice, and defendants
should  win  all  cases  in  which  there  was  no  malpractice.199  In  fact,
plaintiffs won only 43% of the cases where the independent reviewers
196 Studdert & Mello, supra note 191, at S59, S63.
197 Id. at S65. Presumably this correlation also drove down the amount of any settle-
ments, which are usually made in light of the expected value of a case if it had gone to trial.
198 Results  are  from  Studdert  &  Mello,  supra  note  191,  at  S63  tbl.3  (2007).  The
numerical jury outcomes are reverse-calculated from the percentages given by Studdert
and Mello. The nine percent discordant outcome in no-malpractice cases is consistent with
either ten or eleven discordant outcomes, but I have used eleven for the sake of simplicity.
Using ten discordant outcomes would reduce total accuracy to 69%, instead of 70%. This
difference does not affect the broader argument.
199 There could, however, be other legal issues, such as the statute of limitations, which
reach the jury and cause them to find for the defendant on a claim that otherwise should
have gone to the plaintiff based on the scientific merits alone.222 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
found actual malpractice. In contrast, when there was no malpractice,
defendants won 91% of the time.200 Contrary to the alarmist claims
made by the American Medical Association (AMA) and malpractice
insurers,201  juries  appear  to  have  a  pro-defense  bias.  Other  studies
have reached similar results.202
Although  these  findings  may  be  surprising,  they  are  perfectly
consistent with the story told in Part I. To a layperson, a hired gun
arguing for the truth looks quite like a hired gun arguing against the
truth; they present no real signal. Thus, the counterpoised hired guns
often  leave  lay  factfinders  in  equipoise.  Juries  are  instructed  that
plaintiffs bear the burden of proving their cases by a preponderance of
the evidence, such that a jury in equipoise must return a judgment in
favor of the defendant.203 Thus, in a world of hired-gun-versus-hired-
gun cases with this default rule, we should not be surprised to find
defendants winning a disproportionate share of the cases.
The Studdert and Mello data shows a 70% overall accuracy of
outcomes. This is somewhat better than randomness but still far from
ideal. This data can be used to model the potential impact of the blind
procedure, assuming (a) that each litigant had tried the blind proce-
dure and presented the blind expert’s opinion to the jury if favorable,
and (b) that the jury would find the blind expert’s testimony more
persausive than that of the hired gun brought by the other side. The
reasonableness of these assumptions is shown in Part IV below. Fur-
ther assume a 5% error rate, as in Table 1 above. Thus, as in Table 1, a
sole blind expert will appear and reveal a truthful opinion to the jury
90.25% of the time and lead them astray 0.25% of the time. If we
apply these figures to each row in Table 2, we redistribute 90.25% of
the discordant cases to the correct outcome and 0.25% of the concor-
dant cases to the incorrect outcome. In no-signal cases, for simplicity,
200 Although  Studdert  and  Mello  did  not  report  the  significance  of  this  disparity,  a
Fisher exact test shows that this is a highly significant difference (p < 0.0001). The null
hypothesis, that plaintiffs and defendants have the same win rate for the cases they should
win, can be rejected. Studdert and Mello also used a sensitivity analysis to exclude close
cases (those rated three or four on the six-point scale used by independent reviewers) and
found their results mostly unchanged. Studdert & Mello, supra note 191, at S60–S61.
201 See VIDMAR, supra note 9, at 3–8 (reviewing calls by American Medical Association
and  others  for  reform  of  jury  system,  based  on  perception  of  overly  plaintiff-friendly
juries).
202 See infra note 220.
203 The Eighth Circuit’s pattern instruction on “preponderance of the evidence,” for
example,  includes:  “If,  on  any  issue  in  the  case,  the  evidence  is  equally  balanced,  you
cannot find that issue has been proved.” O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 103, § 104.01, at
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assume that the blind procedure would not change the outcome.204 As
shown in Table 3, blinding is a powerful tool: Total outcome accuracy
would potentially increase from 70% to 97%.
TABLE 3
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS WITH
SIMULATED BLIND PROCEDURE
Studdert and Mello’s Data Blind Procedure Simulation
New Jury Truth Jury Outcomes Contrary Signals Outcomes
39 0 86
Malpractice
91 P wins (43%) (0.25%   39) (95%)
52 47 5 (44%) D wins (57%) (90.25%   52) (5%)
11 10 1
No Malpractice
117 P wins (9%) (90.25%   11) (1%)
106 0 116 (56%) D wins (91%) (0.25%   106) (99%)
Accuracy 70% Accuracy 97%
This table gives the basic case for how the blind procedure can
dramatically improve outcome accuracy in medical malpractice litiga-
tion. If the procedure were used widely, and if juries did follow the
opinions of blind experts, the procedure would redistribute billions of
dollars  of  medical  malpractice  verdicts  and  settlements  away  from
parties that do not deserve them and toward parties that do deserve
them, thus improving both the deterrence and compensation functions
of the tort system. Presumably, this effect will also improve the out-
comes of cases that parties settle based on predicted trial outcomes.205
204 For the bottom-left box of Table 1, where both parties try the procedure but neither
discloses a blind expert, this scenario would not change the jury’s outcome compared to
the status quo, since the jury would not even know that the litigants had tried the blind
procedure. In the top-right box of Table 1, where both parties try the procedure and both
disclose favorable opinions, this situation would arguably not change the jury’s decision
compared to the status quo, since the counterpoised blind experts would cancel each other
out just as hired guns do. On the other hand, one might suppose that a blind-versus-blind
situation would be even more favorable to the defendants than a hired-gun-versus-hired-
gun situation, if it more deeply entrenched the sense of equipoise. If so, then the blind
procedure would have a slightly less salutary effect on the accuracy of outcomes. In the
model below, the defendants would potentially steal two of the cases from the plaintiffs in
the first row (4.75%   39), and turn them into discordant outcomes. Overall outcome accu-
racy under the blind procedure would then be 96% rather than the reported 97% in Table
3.
205 See infra Part IV.C (discussing settlement behavior).224 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
Thus, settlements, like trial outcomes, will more closely correspond to
the true values of the cases.
B. Special Issues with Expert Accuracy in Med-Mal
This Section argues that blind experts may be particularly accu-
rate in the med-mal context because of the relative absence of doc-
trinal error (as a matter of law) in medicine compared to other fields.
On the other hand, however, blind experts may be less accurate in the
med-mal context if they succumb to the residual bias of protecting
their fellow physicians.
1. The Absence of Doctrinal Error
Doctrinal error occurs when an expert correctly reports the scien-
tific consensus (or doctrine) on a litigation question, but the consensus
is actually wrong. This subsection explains why this particular type of
expert  error  is  legally  impossible  for  med-mal  experts  in  most
jurisdictions.
For an example of doctrinal error, consider that until 1982, the
scientific  consensus  held  that  excess  acidity  caused  stomach  ulcers,
and thus doctors routinely prescribed antacids.206 Experts testifying to
this effect prior to 1982 might have been accurately reporting the sci-
entific consensus at the time, but those honest and competent experts
would later be proven wrong by a Nobel Prize–winning discovery that
a strain of bacteria actually caused many ulcers.207
Despite  the  possibility  that  current  scientific  knowledge  could
someday be proven wrong, under most state medical malpractice laws,
doctors are held to a “standard of care” defined by the customary
practice of other doctors.208 Other states use a “reasonable doctor”
standard, which likewise is shaped by current medical knowledge.209
For these sorts of questions, the effective error rates of blind experts
206 Paul  Thagard  &  David  Croft,  Scientific  Discovery  and  Technological  Innovation:
Ulcers, Dinosaur Extinction, and the Programming Language Java, in MODEL-BASED REA-
SONING IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 125, 125–27 (Lorenzo Magnani et al. eds., 1999).
207 Id.; see also The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 2005, http://nobelprize.org/
nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/2005/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2009) (announcing award of
Nobel Prize in Medicine for discovery of role of Heliobacter pylori in ulcers). For another
example, see Haack, supra note 19, at 998, which explains that it took thirty years for
Watson and Crick’s model for structure of DNA to become “the standard, well-accepted
view.”
208 See Cramm et al., supra note 194, at 702 (noting that professional custom defines
standard of care in most states). But see infra note 290 and accompanying text (discussing
minority of states that allow juries to decide reasonableness without regard to customary
practice).
209 See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law
at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 180–87 (2000) (describing states that haveApril 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 225
in medical malpractice cases will get even closer to zero, since doc-
trinal  error  is  logically  impossible.210  In  med-mal  cases,  the  blind
expert must only report the consensus of the field and apply it to the
particular case. This analysis suggests that the effective error rates of
blind experts on such questions will be quite low.
2. Residual Bias
On  the  other  hand,  one  might  worry  that,  compared  to  other
fields of litigation, blind experts in medical malpractice will be biased
against finding malpractice, due to their allegiance to other physicians.
This  problem  of  “residual  bias”  would  also  infect  court-appointed
medical experts or medical screening panels. To some extent, it even
shapes  the  pool  of  experts  in  the  adversarial  system.211  In  the  fol-
lowing six points, this subsection addresses this potential problem for
the blind procedure in the med-mal context.
First, the blind procedure might avoid residual bias by requiring a
precommitment by the experts to testify for either side, which may
cause biased but self-aware experts to exclude themselves from the
pool. The litigants and the intermediary would also screen out those
with apparent biases, either from the entire pool of experts or on an
ad hoc basis. For example, the intermediary could exclude from the
pool any expert whose ratio of past testimony is extremely lopsided.
Such  a  screening  policy  could  exclude,  for  example,  those  experts
whose ratio of favoring one side over the other is more than two stan-
dard deviations outside the mean ratio for all such experts. In this
case, it is the experts’ partisanship that is measured, not their relation-
ship to the truth. Some data suggests that such a screening rule may
exclude most of the experts that frequently testify under the status
quo.212  In  some  highly  specialized  fields  of  expertise,  where  the
adopted a “reasonable doctor” standard without rejecting a “custom-based standard of
care”).
210 But see Cramm et al., supra note 194, at 710 (arguing that even medical experts “can
only guess at customary practice”).
211 As authors of one treatise worry, “The well known reluctance of doctors to testify
against one another . . . may . . . effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real
and grievous wrong.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 32, at 188 (5th ed. 1984); see also Trull v. Long, 621 So. 2d 1278, 1279–81 (Ala.
1993) (collecting cases on alleged “conspiracy of silence”). On the other hand, there are
anecdotal accounts to the contrary, such as that radiologists “in both academic and private
practice available to serve as plaintiffs’ expert witnesses are plentiful. Actually . . . defense
attorneys . . . have the greater difficulty finding experts.” Leonard Berlin, Expert Testi-
mony: A Contrary Perspective from the Trenches, 2 J. AM. C. RADIOLOGY 131 (2005).
212 See, e.g., Kesselheim & Studdert, supra note 88, at 275 (showing that only 21% of
frequent  experts  in  neurologic  birth  injury  cases  “approached  an  even  split  of  their
caseload between plaintiffs and defendants”).226 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
experts are already polarized, such screening may eliminate the entire
pool of blind experts, making the procedure unworkable.
Second, even for an expert inclined to favor the plaintiff or the
defendant,  the  intermediary  will  sometimes  be  able  to  frame  and
sequence the questions posed to the blind expert in ways that make it
impossible  for  the  expert  to  implement  that  favoritism.  Especially
when the standard of care is the primary question in dispute, the inter-
mediary can frame the questions in general or hypothetical form, so
that the expert does not know whether the defendant did or did not
perform the appropriate procedures and thus does not know whether
an accurate report of the standard of care will be helpful or hurtful to
the defendant.
Third, the change from being hired guns to being objective expert
reviewers—analogous  to  peer  reviewers  in  academia—may  change
the norms of the expert industry in a way that reduces bias. Whether
this sort of reframing will change behavior is an empirical question,
but “[s]ocial psychologists have long understood that role schemas—
the norms, customs, and responsibilities that we associate with various
jobs and functions—powerfully influence the people who take on par-
ticular roles.”213
Fourth, there are likely other psychological biases that counteract
any temptation to favor fellow physicians. One is known as “idealiza-
tion bias”—the tendency of persons to believe that they are better
than  average  at  performing  some  task,  which  thus  makes  persons
judgmental of others.214 For example, “most drivers overestimate their
abilities and believe that they have a better chance to avoid a serious
accident than others.”215 This phenomenon has also been documented
among physicians.216
Fifth, we do have some evidence that even if experts are biased
toward  defendants,  they  are  less  biased  than  juries,  making  blind
experts still conducive to improved outcome accuracy. The physician
reviewers in the Studdert and Mello study were working in a frame-
work not unlike the blind procedure, and they found that 44% of the
tried cases involved bona fide medical malpractice, while the juries
213 Benforado & Hanson, supra note 130, at 351.
214 See Cramm et al., supra  note 194, at 743 (describing observations of idealization
bias).
215 Id.
216 Id. Another counteracting influence is hindsight or outcome bias, which is the effect
that  knowledge  about  the  outcome  of  an  action  has  on  judgments  of  that  action.  See
VIDMAR, supra  note  9,  at  165–66  (discussing  hindsight  bias  among  expert  reviewers).
When a reviewing physician knows that the plaintiff is injured, it is tempting to assume that
an  error  was  made  in  treatment.  But  see  Cramm  et  al.,  supra  note  194,  at  737–38
(describing hindsight bias, but not observing it in survey of physicians).April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 227
found for the plaintiffs only about 20% of the time.217 Indeed, there
are many similar studies, covering thousands of actual medical mal-
practice  cases,  in  which  independent  physician  reviewers  assessed
whether medical malpractice had occurred.218 Scholars reviewing this
literature conclude that affiliation bias “does not appear [to have had]
any  significant  effect”  on  physician  assessments.219  Still,  one  might
worry  that  blind  experts  will  be  more  biased  than  these  academic
reviewers because blind experts will know that their opinions could be
revealed to, and used against, fellow physicians. The data admittedly
do not fully address this issue.220
Sixth and finally, the adversarial use of the process will tend to
cancel out experts suffering from residual biases. Recall that the blind
procedure only sends a signal when two independent experts agree,
which tends to cancel out errors made by one expert. Thus, even with
a  sizeable  amount  of  expert  error  attributable  to  residual  bias,  the
procedure will still sometimes help accuracy, but will rarely hurt it,
making a positive contribution on net.221 As an illustration, Table 6 in
the Appendix models the blind procedure using Studdert and Mello’s
data, with an assumed residual bias of 30%, meaning that three in ten
of the blind opinions will be favorable to defendants regardless of the
facts of the cases. Even with this assumption, the blind procedure can
still potentially improve overall outcome accuracy from 70% to 84%.
217 Studdert & Mello, supra note 191, at S63 tbl.3 (showing juries finding for plaintiffs in
24% of cases); id. at S58 (stating that plaintiffs prevailed in 19% of trials). The disparity
may reflect differences in methodology between the two analyses.
218 See, e.g., FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 167 tbl.8.2
(1993) (finding in sample of thirty-seven cases decided by jury verdict that independent
reviewers disagreed with pro-defendant verdicts more frequently than with pro-plaintiff
verdicts); Bryan A. Liang, Assessing Medical Malpractice Jury Verdicts: A Case Study of an
Anesthesiology  Department,  7  CORNELL  J.L.  &  PUB.  POL’Y  121,  135–36  &  n.43  (1997)
(describing group of academic anesthesiologists who reviewed twelve malpractice cases
and showed “a significant propensity . . . to be extremely critical of the defendant anesthe-
siologists in the cases”); see also Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care
and  Severity  of  Injury  on  the  Resolution  of  Medical  Malpractice  Claims,  117  ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 780 (1992) (finding that insurance reviewers “determination of physician
care was a good predictor of the outcome of a case”).
219 Cramm et al., supra note 194, at 741.
220 Future studies could explore the opinions of court-appointed experts in med-mal
cases, which may be more closely analogous to blind experts.
221 Of course, this depends on the size of the residual biases, an empirical question. If it
turned out that, say, 90% of all blind opinions were dogmatically biased toward the defen-
dants (and plaintiffs were unable to explain this problem to juries), then the blind proce-
dure would worsen outcome accuracy. But it is worth noting that current data does not
support the existence of such rampant bias.228 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
C. The Blind Procedure as Med-Mal Reform
Prominent  critics  of  the  med-mal  litigation  system  complain
about “the litigation lottery,”222 which results in “jackpot justice.”223
Others  complain  that  “[j]ustice  today  .  .  .  is  basically  random.  .  .  .
Meritorious cases often lose or are settled on the cheap. [Yet] . . .
doctors who did nothing wrong are often hit with huge verdicts.”224
This Part has shown that blind experts are likely to increase outcome
accuracy, which is precisely our desideratum for reforms of medical
malpractice. Yet, many of the other proposed reforms do not serve
that goal as well or as directly.
Compare this fact-seeking reform to arbitrary caps on damages
that disregard the merits of individual cases.225 As other scholars have
explained, such crude policies will not solve what ails the med-mal
liability  system,  but  will  only  “worsen  the  problem  of  under-
compensation  .  .  .  [and]  weaken  providers’  incentives  to  protect
patients from avoidable perils.”226
The  presumed  motivation  for  damages  caps—to  prevent  unde-
served windfall jury awards—can also be served by the blind proce-
dure. At least for the economic portion of a damages award, judges
already have the power to overturn or reduce any award that is unsup-
ported by the evidentiary record.227 When a runaway jury awards out-
size  economic  damages  that  survive  judicial  review,  it  is  thus
presumably following the advice of a runaway expert witness. When a
hired gun estimates how much money it will take to compensate the
plaintiff over the course of his or her entire life, there is a huge poten-
tial for bias since the testimony is more-or-less speculative. (What will
happen ten years hence and how much will it cost?) With the litigant-
induced biases removed, blind experts testifying about damages will
instead tend to have a much narrower range of opinions, clustering
around the true value.
222 OFFICE OF D ISABILITY,  AGING AND L ONG-TERM C ARE P OLICY,  U.S.  DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN S ERV., ADDRESSING THE N EW H EALTH C ARE C RISIS: REFORMING
THE MEDICAL LITIGATION SYSTEM TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 13–14
(2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/medliab.htm.
223 MCQUILLAN ET AL., supra note 3.
224 Troyen A. Brennan & Philip K. Howard, Op-Ed., Heal the Law, Then Health Care,
WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2004, at B07.
225 See  David  A.  Hyman  &  Charles  Silver,  Medical  Malpractice  Litigation  and  Tort
Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1131 (2006) (reporting that
thirty states have imposed damages caps).
226 Id. at 1087.
227 See  Gasperini  v.  Ctr.  for  Humanities,  Inc.,  518  U.S.  415,  433  (1996)  (explaining
judges’ “discretion includes overturning verdicts for excessiveness and ordering a new trial
without qualification, or conditioned on the verdict winner’s refusal to agree to a reduction
(remittitur)”).April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 229
Thus, if used by the litigants, blind experts will help prevent juries
from running away with outlier verdicts. On the other hand, plaintiffs
may be less inclined to use blind experts in this context, and some
defense attorneys may make the strategic decision not to offer a dam-
ages expert at all. Moreover, non-economic damages (e.g., pain and
suffering) would not seem to be as sensitive to the quality of expert
testimony. Thus, the impact of the blind procedure on the amount of
damages awarded is likely to be positive but limited.
Next, compare the blind procedure to the laws enacted in thirty-
one  states  that  require  patients  to  submit  their  claims  to  medical
screening panels before litigating their claims in court.228 Eleven of
these states have already repealed or invalidated such laws due to a
variety  of  problems,  including  the  severe  delays  and  expenses  of
forcing  parties  to  litigate  the  same  issues  twice.229  Moreover,  even
these  panels  presumably  need  expert  truth-signals  to  do  their  jobs.
Some of these panels include seats for laypersons, and it is unlikely
that even the doctors sitting on panels will have the requisite expertise
in the particular medical specialty in dispute in any given case.230 It
may  be  simpler  to  replace  the  screening  panels  that  exist  in  these
states with blinding intermediaries who could help the litigants screen
their own cases with the benefit of blind experts.231
Similarly, some scholars and advocates have proposed creating
specialized health courts.232 The central idea is to remove decisions
from the jury and instead empower specialist judges to find the facts,
because they would presumably be better equipped to do so.233 Yet
these  judges,  who  will  likely  be  lawyers,  not  doctors—much  less
experts in every field of medicine—will still need expert truth-signals
to resolve cases. Moreover, these judges may also be more susceptible
to interest group pressures than randomly selected jurors are.
In short, the blind procedure may ameliorate the need for some
of these other reforms, as it provides an effective means of improving
the accuracy of litigation outcomes without the undesired side effects
228 See Struve, supra note 99, at 988–96 (describing panel systems that exist in thirty-
seven states and criticizing that system from policy perspective).
229 Id. at 990–93.
230 Id. at 991, 995.
231 For a more complete discussion of the screening function of the blind procedure, see
infra Part IV.C.
232 Struve, supra note 99, at 996–98; see also Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, S.
1337, 109th Cong. § 3(d)(4)(B) (2005) (proposing creation of health courts presided over
by judges “with health care expertise” but who only need to “meet applicable State stan-
dards for judges” (emphasis added)).
233 Struve, supra note 99, at 998. But see supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text
(casting doubt on claim that judges have comparative advantage over laypersons).230 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
of  other  proposed  reforms.  Furthermore,  the  blind  procedure  will
likely improve the performance of these alternative efforts.
The  foregoing  discussion  suggests  that  blind  expertise  should
become  a  central  part  of  the  debates  about  medical  malpractice
reform. Rather than overhauling the system of medical malpractice
litigation (a risky, expensive, and politically daunting proposition), it
may  be  more  sensible  to  seek  systemic  improvement  by  simply
investing in the creation of the blinding intermediary and the pool of
willing neutral experts.
As the next Part shows, one particularly important advantage of
the blind procedure is that it can be implemented by the litigants them-
selves (once the intermediary is created). Unlike most other proposals
for  med-mal  reform,  there  is  no  need  to  wade  into  interest-group
politics in order to build the political will to legislate reform of the
litigation system.
IV
STRATEGY FOR RATIONAL LITIGANTS
This Part shows that the blind procedure is a prisoner’s dilemma:
Both sides want to be the only one with a blind expert, and neither
side wants to be the only one without a blind expert. As a result, it is
rational for both parties to commission a blind opinion. The proce-
dure  is  also  a  diagnostic  device  useful  for  selecting  cases  and  for
moving parties toward settlements.
A. Costs and Benefits for Litigants
For a rational litigant, the decision of whether to commission a
blind  opinion  will  depend  upon  its  probabilistic  costs  and  benefits.
There are several variables, including the fees that expert witnesses
charge, the transaction costs imposed by the intermediary, the error
rates  of  blind  experts,  the  perceived  likelihood  that  the  scientific
reality is favorable to the litigant, the amount at stake in the litigation,
and the amount of additional persuasiveness that blind experts will
have with juries relative to unblind experts.
For  illustration,  I  consider  each  variable  in  turn  and  postulate
some reasonable values for each. Although we have some data for
these variables and can offer decent estimates for others, it turns out
that  the  basic  rationality  of  the  procedure  depends  more  upon  the
logic of the adversarial setting than it does upon any particular vari-
ables. The costs could be double what I here postulate, and the bene-
fits halved, and the blind procedure would remain a rational strategy.April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 231
1. Costs of the Blind Procedure
First, consider the costs. Experts must be paid a fee to review a
case and render their initial opinions, regardless of whether they do so
behind a blind. In a med-mal case, for example, one might send the
medical  records  to  an  expert  who  spends  four  hours  reviewing  the
records and reporting his opinions at a cost of $500 per hour, or $2000
in total.234 For now, suppose that it costs an additional $500 per case
to pay the blinding intermediary to select an expert, develop the dos-
sier  of  predicate  facts,  and  transmit  the  necessary  information
between the party and the expert while maintaining the integrity of
the blind.235
If the blind expert is retained but renders an unfavorable opinion,
the entire expense ($2500) is wasted, and the litigant must either try
the blind procedure again or find and retain an unblind expert if he
chooses to proceed with the case.236 On the other hand, if the opinion
is favorable, the blind procedure costs only the intermediary’s $500
fee, assuming that a favorable blind expert will displace a litigant’s
need for an unblind expert and that the costs of subsequent work (i.e.,
deposition and trial testimony) are the same for blind and unblind
experts. If a litigant wants to use both a blind and an unblind expert,
the marginal cost would be higher.
2. The Benefits of Added Credibility
Against these costs, the litigant weighs the projected benefits of
the procedure. The benefits depend on the amount at stake in the
litigation.237 Suppose that, in a given case, there are one million dol-
lars in damages, which is slightly below the mean final judgment of
med-mal cases (after imposition of damages caps) according to one
survey  of  medical  malpractice  cases  in  California.238  For  simplicity,
234 See, e.g., Simon v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 05-941V, 2008 WL 623833,
at  *6–8  (Fed.  Cl.  Feb.  21,  2008)  (approving  $500  hourly  rate  for  medical  expert  and
describing testimony indicating that it takes four hours to review medical records).
235 Notably,  some  of  the  blind  intermediary’s  costs  of  identifying  and  prescreening
experts will displace those that the litigant would otherwise have to perform himself, since
experts must be searched for, identified, and contacted, regardless of whether they are
blind.
236 Nonetheless, this is the only disadvantage for the litigant, since the unfavorable blind
opinion or even the existence of the unfavorable blind expert need not be disclosed to the
adversary or the factfinder. See supra Part II.B.2.
237 For simplicity, I exclude changes in litigation costs and expenses from this analysis.
In reality, a technology that increases the odds of prevailing at trial will be even more
attractive, given that certain litigation costs will be shifted to the losing side and expenses
may be avoided by settlement. See infra Part IV.C.
238 See  NICHOLAS  M.  PACE ET AL., RAND,  CAPPING N ON-ECONOMIC A WARDS IN
MEDICAL M ALPRACTICE T RIALS  20–23  (2004),  available  at  http://www.rand.org/pubs/232 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
conservatively assume that the amount at stake is the same, regardless
of the presence of a blind expert.
If only one side succeeds in retaining a favorable blind opinion,
then that side presumably will be more likely to win at trial, because
that side has an unbiased, objective scientist in opposition to the other
side’s hired gun. The value of this marginal added credibility to jurors
is an empirical question, one that is answered by a large body of data
showing that when juries are flummoxed by the substance of highly
technical testimony they instead evaluate the credibility—and espe-
cially the impartiality—of the experts delivering testimony.239 Indeed,
under the status quo, litigants are advised that in order to prevail with
a  jury,  “[i]t  is  imperative  that  the  [expert]  testimony  not  look
bought.”240 Furthermore, “[a]t all costs the expert must be viewed as a
professional interested in a factual presentation and not an advocate
for one side.”241 According to scholars reviewing the small number of
cases  tried  with  court-appointed  experts,  “[t]he  conclusion  is
inescapable: A [c]ourt’s expert will be a persuasive witness and will
monographs/2004/RAND_MG234.pdf  (showing  mean/median  final  judgments  of
$1,150,000/$293,000 after imposition of statutory cap on damages, and mean/median ver-
dict of $1,637,000/$382,000 before application of cap, in sample of California medical mal-
practice cases from 1995 to 1999). But see David A. Hyman et al., Do Defendants Pay What
Juries Award? Post-verdict Haircuts in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988–2003, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 3–4 (2007) (showing that most plaintiffs received significantly
less than amount jury awarded, due to insurance policy limits and other factors).
239 See Joel Cooper & Isaac M. Neuhaus, The “Hired Gun” Effect: Assessing the Effect
of Pay, Frequency of Testifying, and Credentials on the Perception of Expert Testimony, 24
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 165, 166 fig.3 (2000) (describing experimental results showing
that in highly complex cases, mock jurors found for parties with highly paid experts in only
nineteen percent of cases and for parties with low paid experts in fifty-seven percent of
cases); Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony:
Judging  the  Messenger  and  the  Message,  28  LAW  &  SOC.  INQUIRY  441,  478–79  (2003)
(reviewing studies documenting juries’ tendencies to discount hired-gun experts); Joseph
Sanders, Jury Deliberation in a Complex Case: Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 16
JUST. SYS. J. 45, 61 (1993) (explaining study showing that jurors tended to “discount[ ] all
expert opinions as testimony of hired guns,” but noting that jurors still had views about
“relative effectiveness of witnesses”); see also Hand, supra note 1, at 57 (hypothesizing that
impartial scientists would have “great . . . effect upon the jury”).
240 Gross,  supra  note  4,  at  1164  (first  alteration  in  original)  (quoting  Neil  Miller,
Selecting Expert Witnesses with Litigation Savvy, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 24, 1988, at 44).
241 Id. at 1165 (quoting Harold A. Feder, The Care and Feeding of Experts, TRIAL, June
1985, at 49, 52); see also Ivkovic & Hans, supra note 241, at 480 (describing survey of
lawyers and scientists showing that they prioritized ability of experts to “maintain integrity
and  neutrality,  and  to  avoid  being  adversarial”);  Jasanoff,  supra  note  112,  at  127–28
(explaining that appearance of objectivity is one of two primary criteria of credibility that
litigants attempt to maximize, along with experience); Eric A. Vos, Experts: How To Iden-
tify Them, Confront Them, and Keep Them Off the Stand, CHAMPION, June 2007, at 10,
(“Ultimately,  the  expert  should  sound  like  an  unbiased  witness  and  less  like  an
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have a significant effect upon a jury.”242 A blind expert should have a
similar—though perhaps a smaller—effect.
The magnitude of the added credibility also will depend on the
attorney’s skill at cross-examining the unblind expert offered by the
adversary—revealing her selection bias, affiliation bias, and compen-
sation bias—so as to create a disparity in credibility. On the other
hand, it will also be a function of the blind expert’s personal persua-
siveness and ability to teach complex concepts to the jury. A blind
expert may actually diminish the value of a case if she is a poor wit-
ness, but this is unlikely if the court allows the litigant to bring a hired-
gun expert too.243 The benefits of scientific objectivity and adversarial
vigor should be cumulative.
Altogether, suppose that the odds of winning—and thus the value
of the case—will shift in favor of the side with a sole blind expert by a
modest 10%. If the plaintiff had previously assumed that she had a
50% chance of winning, then she would have valued the case as a
$500,000  asset  (putting  litigation  expenses  aside  for  now).  For  the
plaintiff that secures the sole blind expert, the blind procedure pro-
vides $100,000 in value ($1,000,000   0.1), and the case is now worth
$600,000. Referring back to Table 1, we can see that, assuming both
parties try the procedure, the one with truth on her side receives that
marginal $100,000 in 90.25% of the cases, for an expected value of
$90,250. At least for that litigant, this is a very attractive bet at a cost
of only $2500.
3. The Value of the Truth-Revealing Function
We have so far assumed that each case has a true value, such that
there are underlying scientific or technical facts that are favorable to
the plaintiff or the defendant, and we have assumed that blind experts
will tend to reveal that truth at a particular rate (equal to 1 – e, where
e  is the  base  error  rate).  Thus,  for  a  litigant  who  is  considering
whether to purchase a blind opinion, a primary consideration will be
242 Carl B. Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, The Use of Court Experts in Asbestos Litigation,
137 F.R.D. 35, 41 (1991). But see Nancy J. Brekke et al., Of Juries and Court-Appointed
Experts: The Impact of Nonadversarial Versus Adversarial Expert Testimony, 15 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 451, 470 (1991) (reporting that in mock jury trials of criminal rape case,
“[c]ourt-appointed status did not augment the perceived credibility of the expert witness
and non-adversarial expert testimony was not given uniformly more weight than adver-
sarial expert testimony”).
243 Of course, the litigant would then have to pay the additional cost of retaining a tradi-
tional hired-gun expert. To prevent this, a litigant would likely assess the blind expert as a
potential witness before choosing to bring him to trial, and in constructing the expert pool
ex ante the intermediary would also be sensitive to the need for the experts to be effective
witnesses.234 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
his own relationship to the truth, which can be conceived as degrees of
confidence (r) from zero to one.244 If a litigant is one hundred percent
confident that the truth is favorable, then he will expect that he is
quite likely to benefit from the truth-revealing function of the blind
expert, constrained only by its error rate (e). A litigant who knew her
case was frivolous would have the opposite prediction. Presumably,
litigants do not actually know whether they have the scientific truth on
their side—at least not at such extreme levels of confidence. So let us
conservatively  assume  for  an  initial  illustration  that  each  party
believes that there is a 50% chance that the truth is favorable; in this
case,  each  requesting  litigant  has  a  50%  likelihood  of  getting  a
favorable blind opinion.245 Thus, the $90,250 benefit for the party with
truth  on  her  side  becomes  a  $45,125  expected  value  for  a  litigant
assessing the tactic ex ante.
This  still  looks  like  quite  a  good  bet  for  a  litigant  considering
whether to pay $2500 to buy the initial opinion. Nonetheless, a com-
plete analysis will require consideration of all four potential outcomes
shown  on  Table  1,  along  with  predictions  about  the  adversary’s
behavior  and  more  nuance  about  the  perceived  likelihood  that  the
truth is favorable. The next Section undertakes this complex task; it
will, however, remain true that the rationality of the blind procedure
largely depends on whether the transaction costs are in proper pro-
portion to the potential benefits.
B. Game Theoretic Analysis
Game theory is simply a tool for deciding what to do in situations
where another player is also deciding what to do.246 A game theoretic
analysis  of  the  blind  procedure  demonstrates  that  it  is  a  rational
strategy for a litigant regardless of whether the adversary also utilizes
the procedure. If the adversary does not try the procedure, it is valu-
able as an offensive play to redistribute value away from the adver-
sary. If the adversary does try the procedure, it is valuable either as an
offensive  play  (if  the  adversary  fails  to  secure  a  favorable  blind
244 Note that r is subjective, as it is each litigant’s perception of the likelihood that the
truth is favorable. Thus, there are actually two separate r values, one for each litigant
(rPlaintiff and rDefendant). Although rPlaintiff + rDefendant would always equal 1 if parties had perfect
knowledge, this need not be the case in actual litigation. For a further discussion of the
issue of differing litigant perceptions, see infra note 255 and accompanying text.
245 The party seeking to use the blind has two ways to get a favorable opinion: If truth is
favorable (determined by variable r) and the expert is correct (1   e), or if truth is unfavor-
able (1   r) but the expert errs (e). When r = 0.5, the e terms cancel out, and the odds of
getting a favorable opinion equal r, or 0.5. See equation (3) in Appendix infra.
246 For a review of more comprehensive and formal game theoretic accounts of the pro-
duction of evidence in litigation, see generally Yee, supra note 46.April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 235
expert) or as a defensive play (to try to neutralize any blind expert
that the adversary secures).
1. The Blind Procedure as a Prisoner’s Dilemma
Although generalized equations are in the Appendix, the ration-
ality of the procedure can be illustrated using the stipulated values
from Section A. With these values, we can calculate outcomes in four
possible worlds: where both parties try the procedure, where neither
tries, where only the defendant tries, and where only the plaintiff tries.
The marginal payoffs—the expected values of using the procedure—
are shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4
EXPECTED VALUES OF USING BLIND PROCEDURE
Defendant
Don’t Try Blind
Procedure Try Blind Procedure
Plaintiff
Don’t Try P: $0 P:  $50,000
Blind Procedure D: $0 D: +$48,500
Try P: +$48,500 P:  $1500
Blind Procedure D:  $50,000 D:  $1500
The top-left box is the scenario where neither party attempts the
blind. This is the status quo, so the marginal change is $0.
The bottom-right box represents the situation where both parties
attempt the blind procedure.247 As neither side knows which party is
likely to secure a favorable blind expert (the postulate that r = 0.5), all
potential gains of the procedure are offset. Thus, all that remains in
this strategy profile is an expected transaction cost of $1500.248
For the remaining two boxes (top-right and bottom-left), consider
the two symmetrical situations where one party chooses to use the
blind  procedure  (the  “trying  party”)  and  the  other  does  not.  The
trying party pays the transaction costs and has a 50% chance of trans-
ferring $100,000 from the other party, giving this outcome a marginal
expected  value  of  $48,500.  The  party  that  does  not  try  sees  an
247 These values are actually composites of all four possibilities shown in Table 1 for
which blind experts appear at trial (zero, one for the plaintiffs, one for the defendants, or
two), with the respective payoffs added according to their probabilities. The equation for
calculating these composites is found at equation (6) in the Appendix, infra.
248 The blind procedure will cost $2000 for the expert’s fee, plus $500 for the interme-
diary’s costs. The latter cost is sunk, but when favorable (fifty percent of the time), the
former offsets the costs of procuring an unblind opinion. Thus, the expected transaction
costs are  $500 + 0.5   ( $2000) =  $1500.236 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
expected  loss  of  $50,000  because  she  loses  $100,000  in  the  50%  of
cases in which the trying party gains it.
Assuming that the litigants are unable to coordinate their strate-
gies,  Table  4  shows  that  the  game  is  a  classic  prisoner’s  dilemma,
where “trying” is the defection strategy.249 Trying the blind procedure
is a strictly dominant strategy and a Nash equilibrium.250 If the adver-
sary is abstaining from the blind procedure, it is best to try it, since the
strategy yields an expected value of $48,500. On the other hand, if the
adversary is trying, it is still  best to try, since losing $1500 is much
better than losing $50,000. No matter what the adversary does, each
party will prefer to try the blind procedure.
2. Collusion and Optimism
Table 4 also shows that the blind procedure is not pareto-optimal
for the plaintiff and defendant collectively.251 In the (try, try) strategy
profile, $3000 is transferred from the litigants to the experts and the
intermediary.252 In the (try, don’t try) profile, the two parties still have
a net loss of $1500. This presents a collective action problem for the
litigants, as they would prefer to coordinate on the top-left strategy
profile, where neither party tries the procedure. The potential for such
coordination is a problem for the blind procedure and a problem for
the legal system more generally.
This problem, however, may be little more than theoretical, since
litigation is rife with costly and suboptimal strategies that litigants use
to  redistribute  value  from  their  adversaries.  For  example,  in  large
cases, both parties hire experienced trial attorneys, jury consultants,
trial  presentation  consultants,  and  highly  credentialed  expert  wit-
nesses, all at great expense. We could imagine litigants instead cooper-
249 In a prisoner’s dilemma, two prisoners can implicate each other, and each knows the
following rules, set by the prosecutor. If one confesses to the joint crime (the “defection”
strategy) and the other denies it (the “cooperation” strategy), then the confessor will be set
free and the denier will suffer a long sentence (e.g., ten years). If both confess, they will
both get a shorter sentence (e.g., eight years). If both deny, they will get the shortest sen-
tence (e.g., one year). The pareto-optimal strategy is for both players to deny, but the
dominant strategy is to confess, because it has a better outcome for each player individu-
ally regardless of what the other player does. “The Prisoner’s Dilemma crops up in many
different situations, including oligopoly pricing, auction bidding, salesman effort, political
bargaining, and arms races.” ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 20 (3d ed. 2001).
250 See id. at 26 (“[A] Nash equilibrium [exists] if no player has [an] incentive to deviate
from his strategy given that the other players do not deviate.”).
251 See id. at 20, 82 (discussing pareto-optimality and noting that mutual defection in
hypothetical  prisoner’s  dilemma  actually  leads  to  worst  possible  combined  outcome,
despite being dominant strategy).
252 This externality should provide some incentive for the population of expert witnesses
to support this intervention, likely through their professional membership organizations. It
also provides an incentive for the intermediary to create the blinding service.April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 237
atively agreeing to use only green attorneys straight out of law school,
forgoing jury consultants in favor of hunches, skipping trial presenta-
tion consultants in favor of chalkboard sketches, and stipulating to the
use of depositions (or even reports) rather than live expert testimony,
all in order to save money. Yet these sorts of deals do not seem to
occur with regularity, and thus we likewise should not expect litigants
to conspire to avoid the blind procedure.
There are various reasons why litigants do not cooperate in these
ways. For instance, litigants often have strong personal enmity toward
each other (indeed, they already have one huge grievance at issue),
their  lawyers  work  under  strong  adversarial  norms,  and  both  sides
practice strategic posturing. There are also problems with monitoring
and enforcing any such deal. Given the positive externalities of the
blind  procedure  for  the  litigation  system,  courts  should  decline  to
assist  parties  by  enforcing  deals  that  would  avoid  the  use  of  blind
experts.
More  importantly,  these  cooperative  deals  do  not  happen  fre-
quently  because  litigants  tend  to  believe  that  they  will  get  more
benefit from these interventions than their adversaries will. Although
a rare few litigants may be ruthlessly rational and pursue cases as if
they were mere lottery tickets found on the street, most litigants see
litigation as an attempt to vindicate preexisting beliefs. Simply put,
litigants believe that they are right, and that investing in these strate-
gies will enhance their ability to prove that fact. In the med-mal con-
text,  for  example,  doctor-defendants  often  believe  that  they  did
nothing wrong, and patient-plaintiffs believe that they were wrong-
fully injured.253 Both parties expect that a blinded expert will vindi-
cate their priors.
Similarly, empirical research has shown that merely assigning per-
sons to one side or the other of a case tends to bias their assessments
of  fairness,  and  such  counterpoised  biases  tend  to  prevent  litigants
from reaching settlements, even when they have the same information
about the case.254 Presumably litigants would also be biased in their
assessments  of  the  true  values  of  their  cases,  or  at  least  optimistic
about blind experts being favorable. Thus, as long as at least one party
253 This demand for vindication is one reason why both plaintiffs and defendants will
leave money on the negotiation table in order to secure or avoid an admission or apology.
See Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REV.
39, 68 (1994) (examining apologies in context of tort law compensation).
254 See Babcock et al., supra note 47, at 1338 (reporting study where affiliation with one
side of case affected assessments of fairness); cf. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics
Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 63 & n.23 (1998)
(reviewing literature on “optimism bias”).238 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
is confident in the truth of his position, the litigants are unlikely to
conspire to avoid the procedure.
3. Robustness
Now that the basics of the game theoretic analysis have been laid
out, consider how the rationality of the blind procedure will change
when the values of the variables are different. Obviously, the proce-
dure will be most attractive where the costs of retaining a blind expert
are small compared to the amount at stake in the lawsuit.
Still, the basic prisoner’s dilemma structure of the game is pre-
served over a wide range of assumptions. For example, cut the stakes
to  one-tenth  of  the  previous  assumptions  and  more  than  triple  the
costs:  In  a  case  with  only  $100,000  at  stake  and  for  which  a  blind
expert opinion costs $8500, it is still rational to try the blind proce-
dure.255 Even in cases where initial expert opinions are very expen-
sive—such as a class action case requiring extensive data analysis—
the  blind  procedure  would  likely  still  be  attractive  to  litigants.256
Generally, litigants are unlikely to make these sorts of fine-grained
calculations, in part because they do not have accurate data to specify
some of the variables. However, they can be confident that within a
very wide range of possible values the strategy of enlisting a blind
expert remains dominant.
C. Settlements and Screening
The previous Section showed that the blind procedure could help
litigants by increasing the likelihood of prevailing at trial. Yet, the vast
majority of cases are never tried, and indeed the presence of a blind
expert may affect the parties’ decisions as to whether to settle or even
whether to file a case in the first place. This Section shows how the
blind  procedure  promises  a  benefit  to  the  litigants  and  the  legal
system as a diagnostic device, even when cases do not go to trial.
Roughly speaking, when litigants are deciding whether to settle a
case,  they  arrive  at  a  settlement  price  by  each  considering  the  fol-
lowing: (1) the perceived likelihood of winning at trial; (2) the amount
at  stake  (both  monetary  and  otherwise);  (3)  the  expected  fees  and
expenses of proceeding through trial; and (4) the costs they will incur
255 This holds constant all the other assumptions in Table 4, including r = 0.5. In this
scenario, the payoff in the (try, try) profile is ( $4500,  $4500) and the payoff in the (try,
don’t try) profile is ($500,  $5000). Regardless of what the other side does, it is better to
try.
256 If there are $3 million in damages at stake, and it costs $251,000 to get an initial
expert opinion, then it is a rational strategy because the (try, try) profile pays ( $126,000,
 $126,000) while (try, don’t try) pays ($24,000,  $150,000).April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 239
if they lose.257 Based on these estimates, the plaintiff can calculate the
lowest possible settlement that would still be better than the expected
value of a trial, and the defendant can calculate the highest possible
settlement that would be better than the expected value of a trial. If
the parties have a zone of possible agreement (ZOPA), a settlement
will be rational, though strategic bargaining may nonetheless prevent
such a settlement from being achieved.258
As we have seen, the blind procedure will affect the price of set-
tlements by shifting expected value toward a party with an unrebutted
blind expert. This is true as long as the parties can agree that blind
experts  have  some  credibility  advantage  with  the  factfinder  over
unblind experts.
In  addition  to  this  redistribution,  the  blind  procedure  may
increase the rate of settlement. Under one economic theory, settle-
ment fails and “a trial will occur when the parties make inconsistent
and self-serving errors in their estimates of the likely judgment.”259
The blind expert may allow the parties to converge on the true value
of a case. Court-appointed experts reportedly have a similar positive
impact on settlement rates.260
On  the  other  hand,  if  upon  learning  that  one  party  has  a
favorable blind expert the parties both symmetrically adjust their per-
ceived probabilities of prevailing, it will not create a ZOPA. Future
empirical  research  should  quantify  jurors’  responses  to  unrebutted
blind experts, so that parties have a common basis of knowledge for
determining the new value of cases when there is a blind expert.
Due to strategic bargaining and optimism bias, there are many
cases where one litigant cannot or will not move her demands based
on the new information. In those situations, a blind expert may create
a ZOPA by causing the other party to move closer. For example, in a
sample of sixty-three California medical malpractice cases that went
to trial during one year in the 1980s, researchers found that defen-
257 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (discussing settlement factors).
258 See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 974–77 (1979) (examining strategic behavior
in divorce cases and noting that “[i]f the parties get heavily engaged in strategic behavior
. . . a courtroom battle may result, despite both parties’ preference for a settlement”).
259 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotia-
tions and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 321 (1991). Gross and
Syverud also discuss another theory of negotiation failure, which attributes failure to “stra-
tegic ploys that misfire” during bargaining. Id. at 321.
260 See, e.g., Science on Trial (XM Satellite Radio broadcast Apr. 29, 2006), transcript
available at http://www.acfnewsource.org/science/science_on_trial.html (describing experi-
ences of one U.S. district judge who said that court-appointed experts “made it easier for
everyone to find a settlement they could live with”).240 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
dants refused to make any settlement offer at all approximately sixty
percent of the time.261 Nonetheless, in these zero-dollar–offer cases,
the plaintiffs prevailed at trial about one-third of the time, with an
average recovery of about $213,000.262 If the plaintiff’s attorney cor-
rectly  thinks  that  the  expected  chances  of  winning  in  a  zero-
dollar–offer case are one in three, these cases are still a good bet for
the  attorney.263  However,  if  the  defendants  were  able  to  retain
favorable blind experts in some of these cases—and thereby further
reduce  the  plaintiff’s  perceived  odds  of  prevailing—then  it  may  no
longer be rational for a plaintiff to proceed.264 Since the defendant is
already at zero, she cannot then update her demand, and the blind
expert has made settlement more likely. On the other hand, in cases in
which the plaintiff can secure a blind expert, the defendant will be
more compelled to make a realistic settlement offer.
Furthermore, whichever side secures a favorable blind expert will
likely disclose that fact very early to save itself—as well as the adver-
sary and the legal system—the costs of litigating to the brink of trial.
One recent study showed that to defend a malpractice case that results
in  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  it  costs  insurers  an  extra  $70,000  in
expenses alone.265 If an investment of a few thousand dollars on a
blind opinion shifts the odds toward settlement rather than trial, it
would  be  a  good  investment  for  a  litigant,  even  aside  from  the
opinion’s value in changing the outcome of a potential trial.
Even before litigation begins, the blind procedure can help attor-
neys make better decisions regarding which cases to take. For a few
thousand dollars, an attorney can send a potential case to the interme-
261 Gross & Syverud, supra note 261, at 346 tbl.3, 360. Gross and Syverud suggest that
insurers use this zero-dollar–offer tactic to deter future cases and because insurance con-
tracts provide physician defendants with a veto over settlement, even though the insurers,
not the defendants, bear the expenses of trial. Id. at 361.
262 Id. at 346. The average recovery in these cases was $108,000 in 1986 dollars, which I
have adjusted to $213,000 in 2009 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation
calculator, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
263 If a plaintiff’s attorney can prosecute one of these claims for, say, $25,000 in expenses
on  a  40%  contingent  fee,  it  is  worthwhile  to  proceed  to  trial.  The  expected  utility  is
(0.33   $213,000   0.4) + (0.67    $25,000) = $11,366. In the win scenario, the attorney
recovers the expenses from the judgment amount, so expenses are only considered in the
loss scenario. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 261, at 349 n.71 (describing recovery of
expenses in contingent fee cases).
264 Suppose that if the defendant secures an unrebutted blind expert, the plaintiff’s per-
ceived odds of prevailing decrease from one in three to one in five. Now, given the other
parameters in supra note 265, the net utility of going to trial is  $2960.
265 David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical
Malpractice  Litigation,  354  NEW E NG.  J.  MED.  2024,  2027  (2006)  (showing  that  claims
resolved in plaintiff’s favor at trial cost insurer $112,968 in defense costs, while those claims
resolved out of court cost only $42,015).April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 241
diary, and a few weeks later get back a well-qualified expert opinion,
saving the attorney lots of work and uncertainty in deciding whether
to take the case.266 Some plaintiffs’ attorneys, who have large invento-
ries of cases to choose from, may use the blind procedure as the sine
qua  non  for  prosecuting  a  case,  since  those  cases  will  lead  to  the
largest and quickest settlements and will be the ones that are the least
likely to face a blind expert on the other side.
In this sense, the blind procedure provides litigants with not only
a big gun to use at trial, but it also provides an assessment device
showing  which  battles  are  worth  fighting  in  the  first  place.  To  the
extent that the blind procedure channels bona fide cases into the legal
system—and bad cases out of it—it is a salutary device for both justice
and efficiency.
V
COMPARISONS, LOGISTICS, TRUTH, AND PROGRESS
Now that the essential structure of the blind procedure has been
laid  out,  this  Part  will  address  several  remaining  issues.  Section  A
compares  the  blind  procedure  to  Daubert  and  court-appointment,
showing how the blind procedure can supplant many features of the
current systems. Section B explores some questions about the role of
expertise when the truth is indeterminate. Section C provides some
thoughts  about  how  the  blind  procedure  could  be  implemented  to
ensure  the  robustness  of  the  blinds  while  still  adequately  compen-
sating the blind experts. Section D asks why litigants have not already
employed such blinding methods, explores whether bounded ration-
ality may prevent litigants from using the procedure, and reflects on
directions for future study, especially the application of the procedure
beyond medical malpractice litigation.
A. The Case for Reform over Court-Appointment and Daubert
This Section explains why the legal system should encourage and
facilitate the use of the blind procedure. I argue that the blind proce-
dure is a sensible and efficient reform, superior to court-appointment
and Daubert screening, and I show how the blind procedure could
work in conjunction with those mechanisms.
266 Litigants already use consulting experts for this purpose, but it requires effort to find
such experts, and it may be difficult to get an objective assessment from them since they
know who is asking.242 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
1. The Case for Reform
So far, this Article has shown that the blind procedure is rational
for litigants, since it provides the potential to win more cases; and that
the procedure is beneficial for the legal system’s factfinders, since it
provides them with reliable fact-signals. But are blind experts worth-
while for the legal system as a whole?
Admittedly, the blind procedure has costs. Given the illustrative
assumptions above, the average case litigated with blind experts will
cost the litigants a few thousand dollars more than litigation under the
status quo, since the intermediary must be paid and since some blind
opinions  will  be  unfavorable  and  thus  will  go  unused  by  the  spon-
soring litigants. It should be noted that these costs will not be borne
by the courts; the costs will be borne by the litigants, and dispropor-
tionately by those who are fighting against the truth. As such, the pro-
cedure is like a voluntary excise tax on bad cases, where the revenues
are used to improve the accuracy of the legal system.267
Furthermore, the costs must be weighed against the likely bene-
fits. With fact-signals from blind experts, factfinders can more accu-
rately impose liability, compensating worthy plaintiffs and deterring
potential future defendants. In addition, it is likely that this innovation
will reduce insurance costs by reducing litigation uncertainty. We can
also expect more cases to be settled and fewer frivolous claims and
defenses  to  be  litigated  in  the  first  place.  Thus,  the  procedure  will
likely reduce litigation costs on net.
The case for reform is thus clear. It would be a worthwhile invest-
ment of a few million dollars to create the blinding intermediary as a
self-financing public good for litigants to use in serving their private
and the public interests.
2. Comparison with Court-Appointment
Of course, to the extent that courts want to solve the problem of
expert bias, judges can simply hire their own neutral experts, which
may seem more direct and efficient than the complicated blind proce-
dure. However, there are two problems with court-appointment that
the blind procedure solves.
First,  as  explained  in  Part  I.C,  there  are  substantive  concerns
about the accuracy and fairness of court-appointed experts because,
while they enjoy strong deference from factfinders, their errors cannot
267 Cf. RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  ECONOMIC A NALYSIS OF L AW  611  (7th  ed.  2007)
(“[O]ffsetting expenditures on litigation are not necessarily wasteful from a social as dis-
tinct from a private standpoint, since . . . they increase the probability of a correct decision
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be effectively rebutted by litigants. As shown in Table 1, the adver-
sarial  blind  procedure  improves  on  court-appointment  because  it
relies upon two independent expert assessments of the truth, so that
whenever one errs, the other is ready to rebut her with equal credi-
bility. The signals sent by blind experts to factfinders are thus more
reliable than the signals sent by court-appointed experts. Although it
is  still  possible  that  a  blind  expert  will  hijack  the  case  with  an
erroneous but unassailable opinion, this scenario is much more likely
to occur with court-appointed experts.268
On  the  other  hand,  it  may  seem  advantageous  that  court-
appointment sends some signal in every case where the procedure is
used,  while  the  blind  procedure  fails  to  send  a  signal  in  the  cases
where the two blind experts disagree. But more signals are not neces-
sarily better; the reliability of the signals matters too. In the 400 hypo-
thetical cases discussed above, the blind procedure sends true signals
in 361, a false signal in 1 case, and no signal in 38 cases. If court-
appointed experts enjoyed the same 5% error rate, then they would
send  380  true  signals  and  20  false  signals.  So,  although  a  court-
appointed expert procedure would send 19 extra true signals, it would
also send 19 extra false signals. As such, the accuracy of those extra
signals is only 50%, and thus, would likely harm the accuracy of any
factfinder who could otherwise do better hearing from two hired guns
and making their own decision.269 Thus, the blind procedure is more
salubrious for the accuracy of litigation outcomes—sending a signal
where it can help and wisely refraining where it cannot—and is more
respectful of the jury’s role and competence.
One might argue that the extra accuracy purchased by the blind
procedure is unnecessary, and that one court-appointed expert would
suffice. This of course depends on the accuracy of independent experts
in a given field, and our tolerance for erroneous litigation outcomes.
But in reality, the question is whether zero unbiased experts under the
status quo is better than two under the blind procedure. While courts
have for decades enjoyed the explicit authority to use court-appointed
experts, they have generally declined to do so. The blind procedure
instead gives the power to the litigants, who have the proper incen-
tives and roles to use it. Even if the blind procedure were no more
accurate  or  efficient  than  court-appointment,  it  would  be  a  better
policy because it actually holds the promise of being used.
268 Moreover, it seems likely that a blind expert that errs will be more assailable by the
adversary since the blind expert does not enjoy the imprimatur of the court.
269 Recall that the juries in the Studdert and Mello study enjoyed 70% accuracy. See
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Thus, it may be time to turn the page on the noble idea of court-
appointed experts and instead work toward a reality of adversarial
blind experts. Still, the two procedures can be complementary. Judges
can use their current power to appoint experts under Rule of Evi-
dence 706 as a means of encouraging litigants to use the blind proce-
dure. The Rule contemplates that courts “may request the parties to
submit  nominations”  of  experts  for  appointment.270  In  doing  so,
courts could presumably add a strong preference that nominees be
selected through the blind procedure. Such a proviso would expedite
the process of getting a neutral expert opinion into court, without bur-
dening  the  judge  with  the  details  and  without  requiring  her  to  go
beyond her traditional role as a passive arbiter of the law. With such a
method, the judge need not get into the evidence-producing or fact-
finding functions herself.
If after receiving such nominations the judge did appoint a blind
expert as its own, the court could then shift the expenses of paying
that expert to the losing party as a taxable cost.271 Such a policy would
help reassure litigants with modest means that if they have the truth
on their side, the blind procedure will be costless.272 Even if the court
declines to appoint a nominated blind expert, the parties may still use
favorable opinions on their own, and they are likely to do so, since the
cost of securing the opinion is already sunk. In this way, the judge’s
request for nominations may suffice to motivate litigants to use the
blind procedure, if its rationality is not already sufficiently clear to
them.
3. Comparison with Daubert
The blind procedure could also have a mutually reinforcing rela-
tionship  with  the  judge’s  gatekeeping  function  of  Daubert  and  its
progeny; the procedure may even make these gatekeeping functions
nearly  obsolete.  Arguably,  the  litigant-induced  biases  discussed  in
Part  I.B—selection,  affiliation,  and  compensation—are  the  root
causes of the problem of unreliable expert testimony and junk science
in court. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the
270 FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
271 See FED. R. EVID. 706(b) (“[T]he compensation shall be paid by the parties in such
proportion and at such time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as
other costs.”).
272 As another solution to this problem, courts could increase the case filing fee for
litigants without blind experts (in cases that require an expert) and use the additional funds
to subsidize the costs of blind experts for indigent litigants. Some states already require
that plaintiffs’ attorneys file “certificates of merit” indicating that they have a favorable
opinion from a qualified expert. Struve, supra note 88, at 174. This proposal would simply
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gatekeeping function is to “make certain that an expert . . . employs in
the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes
the  practice  of  an  expert  in  the  relevant  field.”273  By  randomly
selecting  an  expert  from  the  practicing  field,  and  by  asking  her  to
render  an  opinion  from  behind  a  blind,  the  procedure  serves  that
desideratum much more directly than Daubert itself does. Thus, when
faced with a blind expert, the judge need not second-guess the testi-
mony. If the courts do defer to blind experts in this way, making them
nearly immune to Daubert challenges, this will provide yet another
reason for litigants to invest in blind opinions.
The presence of a blind expert may also make it untenable for an
adversary  to  survive  Daubert  screening  or  summary  judgment  with
only  a  hired  gun.  Currently,  judges  may  feel  reluctant  to  exclude
experts where there appears to be a genuine disagreement and the
judge is left near equipoise. But the blind procedure creates a dis-
parity and raises questions about the scientific integrity of the expert
that is willing to testify without the protection of a blind. How much
probative value does a hired gun have, if Judge Weinstein is correct
that an unblind “expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost
any  factual  theory,  no  matter  how  frivolous  .  .  .  ?”274  Indeed,  the
Supreme Court recently altogether refused to consider certain social
science  evidence  because  it  seemed  tainted  by  litigant-induced
biases.275 If courts do tend to exclude unblind experts for this reason,
it will only further increase the value of the blind procedure to liti-
gants and increase the rate of settlements.
These insights may even lead courts or legislatures to revise the
doctrine of summary judgment to hold that a party does not create a
“genuine issue as to any material fact” by merely introducing the testi-
mony of an unblind expert.276 Extending this line of thought further,
273 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
274 Weinstein, supra note 31, at 482.
275 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2626 n.17 (2008) (“The Court is aware
of a body of literature running parallel to anecdotal reports, examining the predictability of
punitive awards by conducting numerous ‘mock juries,’ where different ‘jurors’ are con-
fronted with the same hypothetical case. . . . Because this research was funded in part by
Exxon, we decline to rely on it.” (citation omitted)); see also In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig.,
398  F.  Supp.  2d  563,  627–28,  640  (S.D.  Tex.  2005)  (excluding  expert  testimony  in  part
because compensation bias was prominent).
276 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (stating standard for summary judgment). Indeed, some
courts have held that conclusory expert opinions are insufficient to create a genuine dis-
pute of material fact. See, e.g., Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi., 877
F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n expert’s declaration, full of assertion but empty of
facts and reasons, won’t get a case past a motion for summary judgment . . . .” (citing
Richardson  v.  Richardson-Merrell,  Inc.,  857  F.2d  823,  829–32  (D.C.  Cir.  1988)));  cf.
Jimenez v. GNOC, Corp., 670 A.2d 24, 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (“When an246 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
the blind procedure may tip the scales in cases where a judge may
order a new trial.277
Still, this Article does not suggest that courts should effectively
ban unblind experts from the courtroom. Instead, this Article suggests
a hybrid approach to factfinding, allowing litigants to use the blind
procedure to eliminate certain biases, but also allowing litigants to use
traditional  means  of  presenting  their  most  powerful  cases  to  the
factfinders. The elimination of litigant-induced biases is only a signal
of the truth—an epistemic device, not a guarantee.
In any given case, a blind expert may be wrong, while an unblind
expert  may  be  right,  and  there  is  an  element  of  luck  involved  in
securing a favorable blind opinion. Indeed, Table 1 showed that in a
small  but  significant  number  of  cases,  neither  side  will  be  able  to
secure a blind expert. A ban on unblind experts would effectively dis-
miss such cases, leading to systematic underdeterrence and undercom-
pensation.  As  a  result,  the  system  still  needs  unblind  experts  and
traditional Daubert gatekeeping.
Further, there will be a rare subset of cases where the relevant
scientific consensus doctrine is wrong, but there is at least one or more
dissenting “minority experts” who have discovered the truth but have
not persuaded their colleagues to revise the consensus view.278 In this
very small subset of cases, the blind procedure will tend to send false
signals  to  the  factfinders,  while  a  handpicked,  unblind  expert  may
instead be correct.279
A hybrid approach of both blind and unblind experts is most con-
sistent with contemporary legal doctrine. The modern, post-Daubert
standards for admissibility of expert testimony do not require Frye’s
expert’s opinion is merely a bare conclusion unsupported by factual evidence, . . . it is
inadmissible.”).
277 If a jury’s verdict follows an unblind expert rather than a blind expert, a judge may
determine that the verdict is against the “great weight of the evidence” and amounts to a
“miscarriage of justice,” and therefore order a new trial. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1076 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (stating legal standard for
new trial); see also Hand, supra note 1, at 57 (suggesting that courts could grant new trials
if juries rule contrary to neutral expert panels). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A)
(outlining grounds for granting new trial following jury verdict).
278 See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d
ed.  1996)  (describing  process  whereby  “normal  science”  encounters  “anomalies”  and
enters into crisis which then may lead to “scientific revolution”).
279 Of course, in many areas of the substantive law, these sorts of scientific errors are
irrelevant because the law instead depends on the state of the art or customary practice at
the relevant period of time. See supra text accompanying notes 208–12 (defining and dis-
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“general acceptance” in the scientific community,280 but instead only
demand indicia of reliability and the use of the scientific method.281 A
ban on unblind experts would effectively resurrect the Frye standard,
since  it  is  unlikely  that  experts  in  the  minority  will  be  randomly
selected through the blind procedure. Thus, a party that is unable to
secure a blind expert should be allowed to use the traditional methods
and the factfinder should be allowed to give that testimony as much or
as little weight as she thinks it deserves. For a Daubert judge (and a
factfinder), an expert’s lack of a blind should be just one of many
indicia of (un)reliability.
B. The Indeterminacy of Truth
This  Section  addresses  a  potential  philosophical  concern  about
this Article’s simplified conceptualization of blind experts as capable
of revealing “scientific truth.” In repeatedly referring to the “accu-
racy” of experts and trial outcomes, this Article has explicitly assumed
that there is a right or wrong answer in the cases litigated.282 In short,
I have assumed that in any case there is a scientific question that truly
cuts in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant.
Yet suppose that there are cases where there is no right or wrong
answer given by a preexisting and independent scientific reality. This
may be especially true in the subset of cases that are tried rather than
settled.283 For example, there may be some med-mal cases on the cut-
ting edge of medical practice, where there is no specifiable “correct”
standard of care—only differences of opinion and value judgments. In
patent law, there may be no “fact of the matter” as to the novelty of a
particular patent claim. In certain types of litigation, law professors
280 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that grounds
for scientific testimony “must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs”).
281 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, 597 (1993); see also id. at
589 (holding that Frye “should not be applied in federal trials”); Michael S. Jacobs, Testing
the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror
“Incompetence” and Scientific “Objectivity,” 25 CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1993) (criti-
cizing “the notion that majoritarian science should serve as the gold standard for legal
inquiries into complicated matters of scientific fact”).
282 See supra text accompanying note 17.
283 See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF THE LAW 122 (1978)
(discussing “radical theory” that prior to trial parties have conceded all that can be proven
objectively, such that only ambiguity remains); VIDMAR, supra note 9, at 175 (“[T]he cases
that juries decide contain a high proportion of disputes where the evidence is most ambig-
uous.”); Liang, supra note 220, at 140 (finding significant divergence of opinion among
academically  practicing  anesthesiologists  reviewing  summaries  of  tried  cases).  But  see
Studdert & Mello, supra note 191, at S69 (noting that independent physicians rated only
twenty-seven percent of tried cases in study sample as “close calls,” essentially same pro-
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are  called  to  testify  about  issues  that  appear  to  be  value-based  as
opposed to fact-based, such as whether some contract is “unconscion-
able.” How does the blind procedure work in these contexts?
First,  it  is  important  to  note  the  incongruity  between  the  task
given to factfinders (to find the facts) and the substance of this con-
cern (there are no facts).284 The facts may be messy, complex, and
contested, but if we could actually identify areas where there are no
right  or  wrong  answers  at  even  the  more-likely-than-not  standard,
then we should probably exclude the experts, dismiss those cases, or
abolish those causes of action.285 In the med-mal context, many states
already recognize the “two schools of thought” doctrine, which pro-
vides a defense when the defendant applied one of two competing
standards of care.286 Blind experts would tend to reveal such splits,
which is itself a more fundamental truth relevant to the determination
of the proper legal outcome.
Second, if there is actually no truth for experts to converge upon
in a given field, then there will likely be deep disagreement amongst
the  “experts.”  If  litigants  perceive  that  dispersion  of  opinion,  then
they will be less likely to pay the costs of the blind procedure, which
only sends a signal if both experts agree.287 Moreover, if juries per-
ceive that there is no fact of the matter, they may be less inclined to
care whether an expert is blind, thereby reducing the marginal value
of the blind procedure, which further decreases the likelihood that the
litigants will use it. Thus, in these contexts of great indeterminacy, the
blind procedure may not be used.
Third, there are undoubtedly some cases where the factfinder’s
job is as much about choosing values as it is about determining exoge-
nous  facts.  For  example,  some  states  have  decided  that  med-mal
claims will not be resolved conclusively by reference to the customary
284 Indeed, the whole point of bringing expert witnesses is to “assist the trier of fact to
understand  the  evidence  or  to  determine  a  fact  in  issue.”  FED.  R.  EVID.  702;  accord
Tockstein v. Spoeneman, No. 4:07CV00020 ERW, 2009 WL 2143762, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July
14, 2009) (excluding expert testimony on whether contract is unconscionable as matter of
law because testimony would not assist in resolving question of fact).
285 For example, if there simply is no right or wrong way to practice astrology, then we
should  not  have  malpractice  liability  for  professional  astrologers.  Indeed,  a  search  of
ALLCASES  in  Westlaw  for  “astrology  /s  malpractice”  reveals  no  such  cases  (last  per-
formed Feb. 24, 2010).
286 See Cramm et al., supra note 194, at 704–05 (describing “two schools of thought”
doctrine in medical malpractice); see also Shectman v. Bransfield, 959 A.2d 278, 284–86
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (applying two schools of thought doctrine when “there is
no standard of care” but only “a matter of medical judgment”).
287 See supra text accompanying notes 191–92 (discussing strategic use of blind experts
by litigants); see also infra Appendix tbl.5 (showing that as error rate (e) increases, fre-
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practice of doctors; these states instead empower the jury to conduct
an  independent  assessment  of  the  reasonableness  of  defendants’
actions.288 This may reflect a policy recognition that the practice of
medicine is infused with not just facts but also values, and that the jury
has a role in deciding what risks are reasonable.289
Yet even in situations where the judge’s or jury’s determinations
are based on facts and values, expert testimony will be revealing as to
the former and may be educative as to the latter.290 Similarly, outside
the courtroom, laypersons must make value-laden decisions, such as
choosing between two different cancer treatments that each have a
different matrix of costs, likelihood of extending life, and side effects
for the quality of those remaining months. Even if there is no objec-
tively right or wrong answer, if informed choices are better than unin-
formed choices then unbiased information will be more useful than
biased information. Indeed, the more complex, value-laden, and con-
tested the questions get, the more we cling to those advisers who we
can trust.
So, even when this Article’s simplifying assumptions are loosened
and a more nuanced account of facts and values is introduced, the
utility  of  blind  expertise  remains  strong.  To  the  extent  that  the
factfinders have a meaningful decision to make, blind experts are sure
to be just as helpful, and likely more helpful, than unblind experts.
C. Logistics of Blinds and Fees
Part II.B specified some of the basic mechanisms for operational-
izing  the  blind  procedure.  This  Section  addresses  a  few  additional
logistical questions.
1. The Robustness of the Blinds
First, one might worry that the first blind—the random selection
of  experts—might  be  compromised.  For  example,  multiple
intermediaries may arise, each developing a skewed roster of experts,
288 Peters, supra note 211, at 172–87; see also Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury
in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA L. REV. 909, 911–12 (2002) (assessing whether juries
are capable of making informed decisions under reasonableness standard and whether this
standard is superior to customary practice standard).
289 This sort of policy is problemmatic, if jurors suffer from hindsight bias. See Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
571, 574, 612 (1998) (arguing that there is likely bias in ex post assessments of reasonable
care but that reliance by courts on custom in medical malpractice serves to reduce bias).
290 See  D.  Michael  Risinger,  A  Functional  Taxonomy  of  Expertise,  in  1  DAVID  L.
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TES-
TIMONY 121, 141 (2008 ed.) (describing various contexts where “normative expertise” may
be permitted, including professional malpractice cases).250 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
so that a litigant’s choice of intermediary will itself create a selection
bias. Of course, if the adversary could discover and reveal this fact of a
skewed pool to the jury, then the value of the procedure to the spon-
soring litigant would be reduced. Moreover, the use of ex ante accred-
itation by the courts, along with contemporaneous monitoring and ex
post discovery into selection procedures, would help ensure neutrality.
To avoid these problems more efficiently, however, there should be a
single,  credible  intermediary  (at  least  for  each  domain  of  inquiry),
such as the American Association for the Advancement of Science.291
How can experts be effectively blind while still receiving enough
information to render an opinion? This Article has alluded to cases in
which  anonymized  medical  records  alone  suffice  to  inform  the
expert’s opinion. However, there will also be more complicated situa-
tions,  where  an  expert  will  need  to  interact  with  the  parties  them-
selves.  For  example,  in  an  employment  discrimination  case,  a
statistician may be hired to compile, code, and analyze a defendant’s
records, requiring the expert to visit the defendant’s offices and even
question  managers  about  the  completeness  and  meaning  of  the
records. Similarly, a medical expert may need to actually examine the
plaintiff.
These  interactions  raise  three  potential  problems  that  can  be
solved by appropriate rules. First, these interactions would inform the
adversary  that  a  blind  expert  has  been  retained,  which  thus  could
create a risk of an adverse opinion being used against the sponsor.
Since the sponsor will not use the adverse opinion in trial, there is no
fairness concern that demands waiver of attorney work product pro-
tections, so courts should prohibit the adversary from informing the
jury that the sponsor retained a blind opinion but chose not to use
it.292  Second,  the  intermediary  and  the  courts  should  assist  blind
experts  in  learning  any  discoverable  information  that  they  need  to
inform their opinions, to the same extent as if either party requested
the  information.  Third,  whenever  a  litigant  interacts  with  a  blind
expert prior to the rendering of an opinion, the adversary should be
allowed equal access and the interactions should be recorded or other-
wise documented. With these principles in mind, interactions between
291 See discussion supra Part II.B (outlining proposed role for intermediary and selec-
tion of blind experts). A potential disadvantage of having a single intermediary would be
the potential for monopoly pricing. Thus, the intermediary should be not-for-profit and
operated for the public benefit. On the other hand, a single intermediary could also allow
the litigants to reduce the costs of the procedure if they each independently agreed to
share a single opinion, so long as the other side also requested one and so stipulated. This
alteration would reduce the accuracy to the same level as a court-appointed expert, but it
would otherwise retain the basic rationality of the procedure.
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the litigant and the expert—which would be necessary regardless of
whether the expert were a blind expert, an unblind expert, or a court-
appointed expert—can be relatively harmless.
2. Compensation Issues
To set experts’ compensation, the intermediary would function as
a broker for litigants and experts. One way to structure this market
would be through a one-shot, sealed-bid auction, where each side con-
fidentially sets a reservation value. Each expert would specify the min-
imum hourly fee at which she is willing to work. Each litigant would
specify the maximum hourly fee he is willing to pay. Experts whose
fee demands are at or below that level would be eligible for selection,
and if selected they would be paid at their demands, not at the liti-
gant’s maximum.
Although experts will be paid for their initial opinion regardless
of  its  content,  one  might  worry  that  this  payment  structure  may
encourage  experts  to  provide  more  extreme  opinions  or  express
inflated levels of confidence in their opinions in order to garner subse-
quent pay for testimony in the same case. This bias may arise if the
expert  assumes  that  litigants  will  discard  moderate  opinions.293
Whether or not this compensation structure will actually bias experts
toward the extremes is a testable empirical question.
However, if the blind procedure does attract a broader and more
representative  pool  of  practicing  professionals,  who  are  paid  at  or
near their opportunity cost for their work, then they might not be par-
ticularly  motivated  to  pursue  pay  for  testimony.  Instead,  they  may
prefer  to  spend  their  time  reviewing  cases  and  treating  patients,
instead of sitting in depositions and trials. Thus, blind experts may not
act strategically to secure subsequent jobs testifying but may instead
call the cases as they see them.
Even if there is a bias to the extremes, it may not be deleterious.
In litigation, the social goal is efficient accuracy in trial outcomes and
settlements, and an expert’s bias toward the extremes may actually
improve  jury  decision-making  in  an  adversarial  system.  If  a  jury  is
faced with an equivocal blind expert on one side, and a powerful state-
ment  by  an  unblind  expert  on  the  other,  the  jury  may  incorrectly
follow the unblind expert, even though he is likely biased in both the
direction  and  magnitude  of  his  testimony.  Thus,  we  actually  may
293 Or an expert might make the opposite assumption and write middling, noncommittal
opinions, fishing for a hire from either side, and then attempt to mold the opinions once
the blind is lifted. This would create the opposite bias.252 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
prefer it if the blind procedure eliminates the directional bias without
eliminating the magnitude bias.
D. Institutional Progress and Future Research
The game theoretic analysis in Part IV showed that the blind pro-
cedure is a rational strategy for litigants. So why has the blind proce-
dure  not  already  been  implemented?  Does  the  absence  of  this
procedure imply its unworkability?
A  complete  answer  to  the  first  question  would  depend  on  a
theory  of  intellectual  progress  and  professional  change,  which  can
only  be  gestured  toward  here.  Nobody  suggests  that  doctors  have
already conceived of and implemented every possible advance for the
practice of medicine, and there is likewise no reason to assume that
attorneys have already done so for law. Even if some attorneys had
conceived of the notion of blind expertise, they would have lacked the
infrastructure to implement the idea. After all, lawyers are in the busi-
ness of prosecuting or defending their cases. Once a case is underway,
it is impracticable to find or create an intermediary that would blindly
select and retain an expert, and the litigant’s role in creating the inter-
mediary for this novel task would undermine any potential gain in
credibility. Therefore, one direction for future study is to survey law-
yers and conduct a natural experiment to see what litigants do once
the idea is circulated and the infrastructure is created.
Other empirical work is necessary. This Article has been rife with
assumptions about empirical questions—from the frequency of blind
experts’ errors to the transaction costs of the blind procedure. If any-
thing,  this  Article  is  a  roadmap  for  empirical  inquiry.  We  need  to
understand the market for expertise and the behavior of the partici-
pants therein.
This  Article  has  explored  the  workings  of  a  blind  expert  pro-
cedure in civil litigation, and medical malpractice in particular. Yet
med-mal is merely a prototype for the basic concept. The problem of
litigant-induced  bias  likely  arises  wherever  expert  witnesses  are
employed in litigation, from products liability cases to employment
discrimination cases, and the blind procedure may be salutary in these
other domains as well.
Beyond  litigation,  variants  of  the  blind  procedure  potentially
have application to any context where experts are relied upon to con-
duct  research  or  render  opinions  when  they  may  have  conflicts  of
interest. Indeed, in some ways it is more important to prevent bias in
journal articles than it is to eliminate bias in courtroom witnesses since
the  latter  depend  for  their  science  on  the  former,  which  are  oftenApril 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 253
funded and shaped by interested parties.294 Such conflicts should be
eliminated wherever possible, and those who proffer, render, or rely
upon unblind expertise should bear the burden of showing why a blind
expert was not used instead.
Looking even more broadly, free-market and liberal philosophies
of  regulation  put  great  emphasis  on  individual  decision-making  by
presumably  autonomous  laypersons  who  are  acting  as  consumers,
patients,  investors,  and  voters.  Yet  there  are  many  contexts—from
securities and mortgage brokerages to medical clinics and biomedical
research centers—where laypersons must rely upon experts to advise
them, and where commercial interests may bias those experts. It may
not be enough to require securities analysts to disclose their interests
in  the  companies  that  they  rate,  and  it  may  not  be  enough  for
biomedical researchers to disclose to participants their interest in an
outcome. Laypersons may also need alternative sources of objective
advice. Some legislatures are moving in this direction with particular
financial regulations.295 Blind procedures may be part of the solution.
CONCLUSION
To be sure, this Article is not the first to examine the problem of
biased  expert  witnesses—litigators,  scholars,  judges,  and  legislators
have grappled with this problem for more than a century. Unfortu-
nately, many have taken for granted the notion that biased expertise is
an inherent part of the adversarial system of litigation. This Article
has shown why that assumption is false, and it has explained how blind
expertise can help meritorious litigants win their cases and improve
the accuracy of the litigation system. As such, this Article offers a pri-
vately ordered solution to one part of an ancient public problem, that
is “the connection [that] subsists between [man’s] reason and his self-
love.”296
294 See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING S CIENCE:
HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH (2008) (describing ways in
which  scientific  process  is  corrupted  by  special  interests).  This  problem  has  not  gone
unnoticed by the courts. See, e.g., In re  Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69, 106
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Weinstein, J.) (“The pervasive commercial bias found in today’s research
laboratories means studies are often lacking in essential objectivity, with the potential for
misinformation, skewed results, or cover-ups.”).
295 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167E, § 7(e) (West 2009) (requiring that banks
shall not make reverse mortgages until prospective borrowers have received independent
advice as to appropriateness of product).
296 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 2, at 41; see also Vermeule, supra note 147, at
403–05 (discussing views of James Madison and describing Constitution’s means of con-
straining self-interested decisionmaking).254 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:174
APPENDIX
This  Appendix  offers  mathematical  equations,  tables,  and
analyses that support the argument made in the body of this Article.
The parts of the Appendix correspond to relevant parts of the Article.
Pertaining to Part II.C
The Blind Procedure as Truth-Signal
Regarding the blind procedure as truth-signal, define (e) as the
“ex ante error rate”—i.e., the frequency of errors in blind experts’
initial opinions. Define the “ex post error rate” (q) as the odds that,
when both parties try the blind procedure, and only one blind expert
is presented to the factfinder, that expert is incorrect. This relationship
is given by equation (1):
e
2
Equation (1): q =
e
2 + (1   e)
2
With our assumed initial (e) of 5%, the expected ex post error rate (q)
is 0.28%. Table 5 shows the ex post error rates (q) given other ex ante
error rate (e) assumptions, along with the frequency of signal rate (f),
which is the proportion of all cases in which both parties try the blind
procedure and only one party secures a favorable opinion. This rela-
tionship is given by equation (2):
Equation (2): f = 1   [e(1   e) + e (1   e)]
TABLE 5
EX POST ERROR RATES AND FREQUENCY OF SIGNALS
BY EX ANTE RATES
ex ante error rate (e) ex post error rate (q) frequency of signal (f)
1% 0.01% 98.0%
5% 0.28% 90.5%
10% 1.22% 82.0%
15% 3.02% 74.5%
20% 5.88% 68.0%
25% 10.00% 62.5%
30% 15.52% 58.0%
35% 22.48% 54.5%
40% 30.77% 52.0%
45% 40.10% 50.5%
50% 50.00% 50.0%April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 255
Pertaining to Part III.B
Special Issues with Expert Accuracy in Med-Mal
This is the analysis for the model simulating the blind procedure
in med-mal with a postulated residual bias by blind experts in favor of
defendants.  Continue  to  assume  that  e  =  5%.  Further  assume  the
residual bias (b) of experts within the pool of blind experts who say
“no malpractice” for any case presented is 30%. Assume that each
litigant tries the blind procedure. As shown in Part II.C above, the
blind procedure only sends a signal when both experts agree, even
though only one of those experts is shown to the jury.
For the subset of cases in which there was medical malpractice
(i.e., plaintiff should win), in 44.22% of the cases both blind experts
will be correct, but both blind experts will be incorrect 11.22% of the
time. These are given by the following calculations:
[(1   b)(1   e)]
2 = 44.22%
[b + (1   b)e]
2 = 11.22%
In the remaining 45% of the malpractice cases, the blind experts will
disagree and thereby send no signal.
For cases where there was no malpractice (i.e., defendant should
win), the blind procedure will send an accurate signal in 93.12% of the
cases, and an inaccurate signal in 0.12% of the cases. These are given
by the following calculations:
[b + (1   b)(1   e)]
2 = 93.12%
[(1   b)e]
2 = 0.12%
In the remaining 7% of the no-malpractice cases, the procedure sends
no signal.
When these figures are compared to those in Table 1 above, one
can  observe  that,  in  cases  in  which  the  plaintiff  should  win,  the
residual bias (b) increases the odds that the blind experts will both err,
and it also decreases the frequency that the blind procedure will send
any fact-signal at all. On the other hand, in cases in which the defen-
dant  should  win,  the  residual  bias  (b)  decreases  the  blind  experts’
errors and increases the frequency of signals.
Table  3  is  expanded  to  include  these  new  findings  as  Table  6
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TABLE 6
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS WITH SIMULATED BLIND
PROCEDURE INTERVENTION ASSUMING
RESIDUAL BIAS
(ASSUMING e = 0.05 AND b = 0.30)
Studdert and Mello’s Data Blind Procedure Simulation
Blind Expert Truth Outcome Contrary Signals New Outcomes
Malpractice
91
P wins 39 4 P wins 58
(43%) (11.22%   39) (63%)
(44%) D wins 52 23 D wins 33
(57%) (44.22% 52) (37%)
No Malpractice
117
P wins 11 10 P wins 1
(9%) (93.12% 11) (1%)
(56%) D wins 106 0 D wins 116
(91%) (0.12% 106) (99%)
Accuracy 70% Accuracy 84%
Pertaining to Part IV.A & .B
Game Theoretic Analysis
The following are the postulated variables and their initial values:
c  =  $500:  Intermediary’s  charge  for  selecting  expert  and  inter-
posing blinds
f = $2000: Fee for unblind expert’s initial opinion
s = $1,000,000: Stakes of case, equal to expected net recovery at
win (damages)
m  =  0.1:  Marginal  benefit  of  unrebutted  blind  to  odds  of  pre-
vailing in case
e = 0.05: Ex ante error rate of blind experts
r = 0.5: Perceived likelihood that truth is favorable to litigant
As for the top-right (try, don’t try) and bottom-left (don’t try, try)
boxes of Table 4, there is a 50% chance (P) of the trying party getting
a favorable opinion, assuming that r = 0.5. This is based on the equa-
tion (3):
Equation (3): P(getting favorable opinion) = r(1   e) + e(1   r)
Recall the assumption that the trying litigant pays the intermediary’s
cost (c) and the expert’s fee (f) regardless of whether the opinion is
favorable, but when the opinion is favorable the intermediary’s fee (f)April 2010] BLIND EXPERTISE 257
normally offsets an equivalent cost that the litigant would have to pay
to  purchase  an  unblind  expert  opinion.  Thus,  on  net,  (f)  is  only
imposed when the opinion is unfavorable. Therefore, the payoff (G)
for the trying party is given by:
G(try) =  c + (P(favorable opinion)   ms)   (P(unfavorable opinion)   f)
or
Equation (4): G(try) =  c + r[(1   e)ms] + (1   r)(ems)   ref  
(1   r)(1   e)(f)
The  non-trying  party’s  payoffs  are  also  determined  by  the  trying-
party’s probability of getting a favorable opinion, and are given by:
G(don’t try) = P(favorable opinion)   ( m)(s)
or
Equation (5): G(don’t try) = r(1   e)( m)s + (1   r)(e( m)s)
The values for the (try, try) profile in the bottom-right box in
Table 4 are given by the following analysis. Consider four possible
outcome worlds ( v w1,  v w2,  v w3,  v w4) corresponding to the cells in Table 1
(clockwise),  according  to  how  many  blind  experts  (B.E.)  appear  at
trial. Assume that one player (T) has truth on his side versus the other
player (F) who is litigating against the truth. For each outcome, let
G( v wn) be the set of payoffs for each party as (T, F). Let p( v wn) be the
probability of that outcome set obtaining. The variable r represents
the odds that a litigant is T versus F, across all outcomes. The equa-
tions are shown in Table 7:
TABLE 7
PROBABILITIES AND PAYOFFS FOR EACH CELL IN TABLE 1
Outcome Probability Payoff
One B.E. for F ( v w1) p( v w1) = e
2 G( v w1) = ( c   f   ms,  c + ms)
No B.E.s ( v w2) p( v w2) = e(1   e) G( v w2) = ( c   f,  c   f)
One B.E. for T ( v w3) p( v w3) = (1   e)
2 G( v w3) = ( c + ms,  c   f   ms)
Two B.E.s ( v w4) p( v w4) = e(1   e) G( v w4) = ( c,  c)
The total value of the (try, try) strategy is given by equation (6):
Equation (6):